In this edition of the Court judgments review, we look at SC’s decision on revocation of Gift deed, Madras High Court’s judgement on Spousal Privacy under Fundamental Right to Privacy, Bombay High Court’s decision on Right To Education amidst matrimonial disputes, Allahabad High Court’s judgement on confiscation of vehicle and right to trade, Patna High Court’s decision on liability of insurance companies and Kerala High Court’s decision on Cruelty in absence of legal marriage.
Supreme Court: A Gift Deed cannot be revoked without specific conditions, especially when no revocation clause is included.
In N.Thajudeen vs. Tamil Nadu Khadi and Village Industries Board, the Supreme Court held that a gift deed cannot be revoked except for the three contingencies, especially if no right to revocation is specified in the deed.
The two-judge bench of the apex court comprising Justice Pankaj Mithal and Justice Ujjal Bhuyan was hearing a civil appeal against the judgement of the High Court that held that the gift deed was valid as it was acted upon and in the absence of any clause in the gift deed authorizing revocation.
The key issue for consideration in this appeal is whether the registered gift deed dated 5 March 1983, was properly executed and accepted as a valid document, which remains effective despite its purported revocation on 17 August 1987, given that the donor did not retain any right to revoke it. The gift deed, designated as Exhibit A-1, was executed by the defendant-appellant and conveys the suit property to the plaintiff-respondent for the purpose of manufacturing Khadi Lungi and Khadi Yarn. It expressly stipulates that the plaintiff-respondent cannot transfer the property for personal gain and that neither the donor nor their legal heirs have any claim or interest in the property from the date of the gift.
A straightforward reading of the gift deed indicates that it is an absolute gift, with no conditions allowing for its revocation. The document emphasizes that the plaintiff-respondent accepted the property for its intended use as of the date of the gift. Evidence shows that the gift was acted upon; the plaintiff-respondent applied for mutation with the revenue authorities and issued a memo on 16 September 1983 (Exhibit A-4), confirming possession of the property and subsequent construction. Exhibits A-2 to A-4 support the conclusion that possession was taken at the time of the gift, demonstrating acceptance by the plaintiff-respondent. Consequently, the plaintiff-respondent obtained full rights and title to the property under the gift deed.
The next question is whether the revocation deed dated 17 August 1987, was validly executed, and if so, what implications it has for the plaintiff-respondent’s rights. Generally, a gift can be revoked under specific circumstances and cannot be revoked simply because no such right was reserved in the gift deed. Section 126 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, outlines that a gift can only be revoked under certain conditions, primarily if agreed upon by both parties or if it resembles a contract that can be rescinded.

In this instance, there is no indication in the gift deed that the donor and donee agreed on any conditions under which the gift could be revoked. Additionally, the gift deed does not stipulate that it can be revoked at the donor’s discretion or that it is voidable. Furthermore, the gift does not take the form of a contract that could be rescinded. Therefore, none of the exceptions permitting revocation apply here, leading to the conclusion that the gift deed is irrevocable. Thus, the revocation deed dated 17 August 1987, is void ab initio and has no legal effect.
The apex court held that while the suit property has not been utilized for its intended purpose, this alone does not justify the revocation of the gift deed. The deed contains no clause that would revoke the gift should the property not be used as specified. On the question of the statute of limitations, relying on C. Mohammad Yunus vs. Syed Unnissa And Ors, the court held that a suit for declaration with an additional claim for relief follows the limitation of the relief sought. Therefore, as long as the right to the property exists, a suit for declaration is not barred.
In conclusion, the first appellate court and the High Court correctly upheld the plaintiff-respondent’s suit. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.
Madras HC: The right to privacy as a fundamental right encompasses spousal privacy, and evidence gathered through its violation is inadmissible.
The Madras High Court, in R vs. B, held that the law cannot permit or encourage snooping by one spouse on the other, and the fundamental right to privacy encompasses spousal privacy.
The single-judge bench headed by Justice G.R. Swaminathan was hearing a civil revision petition for dissolution of the marriage by the husband alleging cruelty, adultery and desertion on the part of the wife. In the case at hand, the marriage between “B” and “R” was formalized on 7 February 2003, resulting in the birth of two daughters. Alleging cruelty, adultery, and desertion by “R”(wife), “B” initiated HMOP No. 61 of 2019 in the Sub-Court, Paramakudi, seeking dissolution of the marriage. During proceedings, “B” testified as PW.1 and submitted Ex.P4, which included the wife’s call data records. In response, “R” filed I.A No. 1 of 2023, challenging the admissibility of this evidence. The trial court dismissed her application as premature on 14 March 2024, prompting this civil revision petition.
The matrimonial petition, filed in 2019, fell under the purview of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, rather than the Bhartiya Sakshaya Adhiniyam, 2023, which took effect on 1 July 2024. The amicus curiae requested the court to consider aspects of the new Act as well and to issue guidance on related matters. Under Section 63(4) of the BSA, 2023, an electronic record must be submitted with a certificate signed by the person responsible for the computer system and an expert.

Sections 39(2) of the BSA and 79A of the Information Technology Act, 2000, further emphasize the necessity of an expert’s involvement in authenticating electronic evidence. In the light of the above three provisions, namely, Section 63 and Section 39 of BSA, 2023 and Section 79A of the Information Technology Act, 2000, one can conclude that a person desirous of relying on any electronic record as a document in evidence must submit a certificate at the time of filing the electronic record.
In the case at hand, the applicable provision is Section 65B(4) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, which provides for the requirement of a certificate as a precedent to the admissibility of evidence by way of electronic record.

Examining the specific case, the husband’s certificate accompanying Ex.P4 stated that the call data was obtained from Jio’s website. However, since the mobile device belonged to the wife, and the husband accessed it without authorization, the certificate failed to meet legal standards. Importantly, the husband’s act of accessing and using the wife’s call data constituted an invasion of her privacy. The Supreme Court in Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) vs. Union of India affirmed that privacy is a fundamental right, and any infringement must follow a lawful and fair procedure.
The court also did not agree with the admissibility of evidence obtained through breaches of privacy, citing Section 14 of the Family Courts Act, 1984.

However, exceptions to privacy rights should be considered only in cases involving national security or significant public interest, where these concerns might override individual rights. In the absence of comprehensive legislation specifically governing the issue of privacy, it is clear that there is currently no established “regime of law” addressing this area. The Family Courts Act, enacted over three decades before the landmark Justice K.S. Puttaswamy vs. Union of India ruling, does not fulfil the requirement of such a regime. The discretionary power under Section 14 of the Family Courts Act does not equate to legislative validation for admitting evidence obtained by infringing on the fundamental right to privacy. Given this context, courts should refrain from independently creating exceptions without clear legislative backing.
Further, spousal relationships are built on trust, and unauthorized surveillance erodes this trust, infringing on an individual’s autonomy. The same principles that protect personal diaries apply to mobile phones, emphasizing that spouses cannot invade each other’s private space without consent. The court underscored that while marital misconduct can be proven through legitimate means such as interrogatories and sworn affidavits, resorting to surveillance undermines the integrity of relationships and legal norms. Upholding the right to spousal privacy, the court concluded that evidence obtained by violating this right is inadmissible.
Bombay HC: The Right to Education cannot be denied due to ongoing departmental or criminal proceedings against an employee.
The Bombay High Court, in Doctor vs. State of Maharashtra, held that the pendency of criminal cases or matrimonial proceedings cannot be treated as an impediment to the right of the petitioner to pursue education or acquire higher qualifications.
The division bench comprising Justice Vibha Kankanwadi and Justice Santosh Chapalgaonkar was hearing a petition against the withdrawal of the No-Objection Certificate (NOC) by Deputy Director of Health Services, Latur district (Respondent No.3), granted in favour of the petitioner for admission to AIAPGET 2024 on the ground that a case has been filed for offences punishable under Sections 498A, 494 r/w. 34 of IPC as well as Section 3(1)(r)(s) of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act.
The brief facts of the case are as follows. On 18 July 2019, the petitioner was appointed as a Medical Officer (Group B) and assigned to the Primary Health Centre in Tamloor, Nanded District. On 16 April 2024, a public notice was released inviting online applications for the All India Ayush Post Graduate Entrance Test (AIAPGET)-2024. Being qualified, the petitioner applied for a No Objection Certificate (NOC) to participate in the exam, which was granted by respondent No. 3 on 28 June 2024. The petitioner subsequently took the exam, securing 184 out of 400 marks.
However, on 24 September 2024, respondent No. 3 revoked the NOC, citing an ongoing criminal case against the petitioner and referencing Clause 4.5 of the Government Resolution dated 19 July 2023, as the basis for this action. The petitioner contested that the mere existence of a pending criminal case should not justify the withdrawal of an already granted NOC, arguing that the right to education is a fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, applicable even to in-service candidates. The AGP representing the respondent, claimed the petitioner was ineligible for an NOC for the NEET-PG entrance due to his failure to disclose the pending criminal case.
The central issue for consideration was whether the respondent’s decision to revoke the petitioner’s eligibility solely on the basis of a pending criminal case was justified. This issue has been addressed by the Division Bench of the same Court in W.P. No. 4415 of 2024. It emphasized that the right to education is inherent in the right to life and personal liberty under Article 21. While in-service candidates must adhere to employment conditions related to service needs, the existence of a departmental or criminal proceeding alone should not negate their educational rights. Issuing an NOC serves to ensure that an employee can fulfil their public duties or that there are no justified reasons for denying further education. Nevertheless, any criteria set for eligibility must not be arbitrary or infringe upon the fundamental right to education, as established by the Supreme Court.

In this case, the petitioner is facing charges under Sections 498-A, 494, 34 of the IPC, and Sections 3(1)(r)(s) of the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, based on a complaint by his wife. The nature of the charges suggests a personal, matrimonial dispute rather than an offence involving moral turpitude, which would affect the petitioner’s eligibility for higher education. Accordingly, the Petitioner shall be treated as eligible and qualified for the AIAPGET Entrance Test 2024, and the revocation order of NOC is quashed and set aside.
Allahabad HC: Arbitrary Seizure of vehicle used for Trade or Profession violates fundamental rights Under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution
The Allahabad High Court, in Kamare Alam vs. State Of U.P. And Ors., held that Article 300A of the Indian Constitution stipulates that no individual shall be deprived of their property except through lawful means and the arbitrary confiscation of property essential for an individual’s trade, profession, or occupation constitutes a significant violation of the fundamental right guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution.
The Single judge bench headed by Justice Ram Manohar Narayan Mishra was hearing a revision petition challenging the confiscation order dated 18 October 2023, issued by the District Magistrate of Bhadohi concerning the seizure of a vehicle (DCM, Registration No. UP1580 6847) by the police at Gopiganj, Bhadohi, on 22 January 2021. The vehicle reportedly used to transport cattle, including cows and bulls, was stopped on allegations of transporting them for slaughter. The owner, Bhure Khan, who had transferred the management of the vehicle to his son Kamare Alam via power of attorney, faced confiscation proceedings following the filing of charges against Alam.
The vehicle’s confiscation was initiated under Section 5A(7) of the U.P. Prevention of Cow Slaughter Act based on a police report. Despite objections filed by Alam asserting the lawful management of the vehicle, the District Magistrate ruled in favour of confiscation, citing evidence of illegal transport. The applicant argued that the order disregarded procedural safeguards and infringed upon constitutional rights under Article 300A, which protects against deprivation of property without lawful authority, and Article 19(1)(g), guaranteeing the right to carry on a profession or trade. The law mandates that confiscation must align with specific conditions outlined in Section 5A, requiring proof that cattle were being transported outside Uttar Pradesh. contrary to the Magistrate’s findings, evidence indicated that the transport occurred within Uttar Pradesh where no special permit is required.

Furthermore, ongoing criminal proceedings had not proven the allegations. As confiscation equates to depriving an individual of their property, the court remarked that the absence of clear, lawful justification renders such action arbitrary and contrary to constitutional rights and due process. Accordingly, the District Magistrate is directed to pass an appropriate release order in regard to vehicle after taking personal bonds and surety.
Patna HC: Payment of Additional Premium by Vehicle Owner Extends Insurance Company’s Liability to driver and cleaner under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988
In Shri Ram General Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Radha Devi And Ors, the Patna High Court held that when a vehicle owner pays an additional premium and the Insurance Company accepts it, the company’s liability extends under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. Only when the additional premium is not paid, liability would be as per the Employee Compensation Act, 1923.
The single-judge bench headed by Justice Sunil Dutta Mishra was hearing an appeal against the judgement of Additional District Judge-V-cum MACT Munger (hereinafter referred to as ‘Tribunal’), whereby it directed the insurance company to pay the claimants. The brief facts of the case are as follows: the case revolves around an accident that occurred near Vaura Bridge on Gangta Main Road on the night of 26 March 2017. A tractor-trailer, loaded with iron rods and plywood, was involved in the accident due to the driver’s reckless and negligent driving, leading to the death of the cleaner, Prem Shankar Modi, at the scene. A police case was registered under Sections 279 and 304A of the Indian Penal Code on 27 March 2017, and following the investigation, a charge sheet was filed against the driver, Phantoosh Kumar.
The claimants, consisting of the deceased’s wife, minor daughter, and sons, filed a claim against the insured owner of the tractor for the death of their family member, who was employed as the cleaner and earned a monthly wage of ₹ 9,000 (₹300 per day).
The Insurance Company’s counsel argued that the deceased was not a cleaner but rather a ‘gratuitous passenger’, as the tractor had a seating capacity for only one person, and thus, liability should not fall on the Insurance Company. They also contended that the tractor was only insured for agricultural use but was being used commercially at the time of the accident.
Conversely, the claimants’ counsel maintained that the deceased was indeed the cleaner of the tractor and not a gratuitous passenger, citing a ruling from the Gauhati High Court that clarified the definition of a gratuitous passenger The only question that remains to be decided whether the appellant is liable to pay the compensation and the quantum of compensation awarded with respect to monthly income of deceased and future prospects as raised on behalf of appellant. The court reiterated that compensation assessment cannot be made with mathematical precision, emphasizing the need for just and fair compensation as per the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.

The evidence presented included an insurance policy showing that the Insurance Company collected premiums for personal accident coverage for the owner-cum-driver and legal liability for the paid cleaner. Since this evidence was not disputed, the court concluded that the Insurance Company cannot evade liability. By accepting the additional premium, the Insurance Company provided coverage for the risks associated with the paid driver and cleaner, further ruling that the cleaner could not be classified as a gratuitous passenger given the circumstances of the case.
Accordingly, the appellant/ Insurance company is directed to deposit the awarded amount with accrued interest as per the award of the Tribunal.
Kerala HC: In the absence of a legal marriage, no offence under Section 498A of IPC would get attracted.
The Kerala High Court, in X vs. State of Kerala and Anr, held that when there is no legal marriage, the woman’s partner did not attain the status of her husband and an offence under Section 498A of IPC would be attracted only against her husband or relative/relatives of her husband.
The Single judge bench of Justice Badharudeen was hearing a petition seeking to quash the Criminal Miscellaneous Case, that has been filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in C.C.No.463/2011 on the files of the Judicial First-Class Magistrate Court-II, Kollam.
The brief facts of the case are as follows- the prosecution claims that the accused committed an offence under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code, alleging cruelty towards the defacto complainant, who is the petitioner’s wife. The Senior Counsel for the petitioner argues that Section 498A does not apply because cruelty must be inflicted by the husband or his relatives and asserts that the petitioner cannot be considered a husband as the marriage, solemnized on 2 November 2009, was declared null and void by the Family Court.
The Family Court found that the defacto complainant was already married at the time of her marriage to the petitioner, rendering their marriage void under Section 11 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.
The Apex Court, in Shivcharan Lal Verma and Another vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, has ruled that for a prosecution under section 498A IPC, there must be a valid marital relationship between the accused and the victim. Without a legal marriage, the partner does not attain the status of a husband, and Section 498A can only apply to a husband or his relatives.

Consequently, the High Court held that as the petitioner has never held the status of a husband, the allegations against him under Section 498A read with 34 of IPC would not stand and accordingly, this matter would require quashment. The proceedings in this case are quashed.