In this edition of Court Judgements, we look the SC’s comments in the bail petition of Manish Sisodia that it’s high time that the trial Courts and the high Courts recognise that bail is the rule and jail an exception, SC’s observation that orders of Delimitation Commission not immune from Judicial review, if found manifestly arbitrary and irreconcilable to Constitutional values, Madras HC’s observation that speeches criticising government policies and actions not public threat, excess usage of such laws will fracture the spine of democracy, among others.
Supreme Court: High time that the trial Courts and the high Courts recognise that bail is the rule and jail an exception (while granting bail to Manish Sisodia)
In Manish Sisodia vs. Directorate of Enforcement, the Supreme Court held that the right to a speedy trial and the right to liberty are sacrosanct rights, and adequate weightage must be given to this factor while adjudicating the cases of bail.
The brief facts of the case are as follows. The Lieutenant Governor of Delhi alleged irregularities in the creation and implementation of Delhi’s Excise Policy for the year 2021-22. Consequently, the Director of the Ministry of Home Affairs ordered an inquiry into the matter through an Office Memorandum dated 22 July 2022. The appellant was arrested by the CBI on 26 February 2023 and later by the ED on 9 March 2023. Despite multiple bail applications, the appellant was kept behind bars for over 15 months and assurances by the prosecution for the completion of trial within 6-8 months fell flat.
The court heard arguments from both parties. The Apex Court expressed concern over the appellant’s prolonged incarceration. After reviewing previous rulings, the Court highlighted that the right to a speedy trial is a fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution. Citing the case of Vijay Madanlal Choudhary and Others vs. Union of India and Others, the Court clarified that Section 436A of the Cr.P.C. should not be interpreted as requiring an accused to endure incarceration for a specified period before being granted bail under the PMLA. The Court also noted that in cases involving delays and extended periods of incarceration, the right to bail should be considered under Section 439 of the Cr.P.C. and Section 45 of the PMLA.
Further, it was highlighted that the case involved approximately 69,000 pages of documents related to both the CBI and ED investigations. Given the vast number of documents, the accused must be allowed a reasonable time for their inspection. Denying this would infringe on the right to a fair trial.
The Court found that the appellant had been incarcerated for about 17 months without the trial even commencing, thereby violating his right to a speedy trial. Relying on the apex court judgement in Prabir Purkayastha vs. State (NCT of Delhi), the Court emphasized that the rights to a speedy trial and liberty are sacrosanct, and the trial court, as well as the High Court, should have given these rights due consideration.
Further, the Apex Court also lamented at how the Trial Courts and High Courts have forgotten the well-settled principle of ‘Bail is the rule and Jail is exception’, and try to play safe. Even in straightforward, open and shut cases, this principle is not followed, leading to huge pendency. The court remarked that it is high time that the lower courts recognize the well-settled principle.
Accordingly, bail is granted to the appellant.
Supreme Court: Orders of Delimitation Commission not immune from Judicial review, if found manifestly arbitrary and irreconcilable to Constitutional values.
The Apex court, in Kishorchandra Chhanganlal Rathod vs. Union of India & Ors., held that as a constitutional court and guardian of public interest, barring complete judicial intervention on delimitation exercise would put people at the mercy of delimitation commissions and such a scenario is contrary to Court’s duties and responsibilities.
The two-judge bench headed by Justice Surya Kant and Justice Ujjal Bhuyan was hearing an appeal against the Gujarat High Court’s judgement that dismissed the appellant’s challenge on the delimitation exercise. This exercise led to the reservation of the Bardoli Legislative Assembly Constituency in Gujarat for the Scheduled Caste community. The Delimitation Commission carried out this reservation under the Delimitation Act, 2002. The High Court, in its judgment, referred to Article 329 of the Constitution and ruled that the Court cannot interfere in electoral matters.
Regarding the factual disputes and the merits of the appellant’s claims, the Apex Court decided not to examine the validity of the Commission’s order, as the delimitation exercise was conducted back in 2006, and significant time has passed, including the undertaking of a new delimitation exercise by the competent authority.
However, the Court disagreed with the High Court’s view that delimitation orders issued under statutory powers are completely immune from judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution. While Article 329 does limit judicial scrutiny concerning the validity of laws related to the delimitation of constituencies or the allocation of seats, it should not be interpreted as a blanket ban on all judicial intervention.
It relied on the judgement of a three-judge bench in Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam vs. State of Tamil Nadu, whereby it was held that constitutional courts could intervene in cases involving election facilitation or when there is evidence of malafide or arbitrary use of power.
Accordingly, it is held that while courts must adhere to established principles regarding the scope and limits of judicial review in delimitation matters, they are not precluded from assessing the validity of Delimitation Commission orders against constitutional principles, particularly if the order is manifestly arbitrary and contrary to Constitutional values.
Madras HC: Speeches criticising government policies and actions not public threat, excess usage of such laws will fracture the spine of democracy.
The Madras High Court, in A Kamala vs. State and Others, held that Individual freedom cannot be restricted based on the whims and fancies of the State, and extreme caution must be exercised while suppressing such fundamental rights. Speeches that criticise the ruling government, its policies, or expose corrupt or illegal actions in the public administration cannot in itself be termed as a threat to ‘Public order’.
The two-judge bench comprising Justice SM Subramaniam and Justice V Sivagnanam was hearing a writ petition for the issuance of a writ of Habeas Corpus and quash the detention order of the detenu Shankar @ Savukku Shankar. While the Counsel for the State argued that the activities of the detenu were detrimental to the maintenance of public order and public peace, the Counsel for the petitioner argued that there was non-application of mind by the detaining authority and since the detenu was voicing against the establishment, this detention order is to strangle from raising criticism.
Upon hearing both sides, the bench remarked that there must be a real threat or apprehension of large-scale disturbance in the society or amongst the people at large to invoke the term ‘Public Disorder’. Further, it is the responsibility of the Issuing Authority to substantiate the grounds for a disturbance or the apprehension of a disturbance to ‘Public Order.’ Allegations or remarks made against individuals do not, by themselves, constitute a threat to ‘Public Order.’
Additionally, in cases of preventive detention, if there is any doubt regarding whether the rules have been strictly observed, that doubt must be resolved in favour of the detainee. Without satisfactory grounds to establish an apprehension of disturbance to public order, mere speeches criticizing the government cannot be brought under the preventive detention law.
The court further held that if the State starts targeting every view and opinion, dissenting voices will neither be silenced nor will this approach yield any meaningful results. There will inevitably be discontent, some of which may be deemed acceptable and some unacceptable, but the State’s responsibility extends far beyond engaging in legal battles to suppress such opinions.
Accordingly, the detention order is set aside.
Calcutta HC: Momentary disagreements resorting to extremities not an inducement, instigation or abetment to commit suicide.
In Joyeeta Saha & Anr. vs. The State of West Bengal, the Calcutta High Court held that a person may become frenzied or hysterical over even minor or brief disagreements, resorting to extremities. Such actions cannot be classified as instigation, inducement, or abetment to commit suicide.
The single judge comprising Justice Ananya Bandopadhyay was hearing a petition seeking the quashing of proceedings under section 306 of the Indian Penal Code. In this case, the petitioner married Gopal Saha, who committed suicide. The husband’s father, the complainant in this case, alleged that the victim’s death was caused by his wife concealing her previous marriage, which led the deceased to suffer mental anguish, ultimately compelling him to commit suicide.
Upon looking at the material facts of the case, the court held that any instance of abetment to suicide must be exceedingly grave in nature frustrating the victim to an extent of resentment, despair and anguish impelling him to commit suicide.
The Court relied on multiple judgements of the apex court on the abetment to suicide. In Mariano Anto Bruno vs. State, the apex court remarked that the essential ingredients of the offence under Section 306 I.P.C. are: (i) the abetment; (ii) the intention of the accused to aid or instigate or abet the deceased to commit suicide. In cases of alleged abetment of suicide, there must be proof of direct or indirect act/s of incitement to the commission of suicide.
In the present case, the victim had, on his own, locked the petitioner (his wife) in a room from the outside and then hanged himself. The petitioner’s wife was unaware of the situation and had no control over preventing the victim from taking his own life.
The court held that extreme actions resulting from intense emotions or depression are often unpredictable and difficult to comprehend. A person may become frenzied or hysterical over even minor or brief disagreements, but such reactions cannot be classified as instigation, inducement, or abetment to commit suicide.
Accordingly, the proceedings under section 306 are quashed.
Delhi HC: Offence of ‘Penetrative sexual assault’ not restricted to men, can be invoked against a woman.
The Delhi High Court, in Sundari Gautam vs. State of NCT of Delhi, held that offences of ‘penetrative sexual assault’ and ‘aggravated penetrative sexual assault’ can be made out against a woman, and it would be completely illogical to say that the offence contemplated in those provisions refers only to penetration by a penis.
The single-judge bench headed by Justice Anup Jairam Bhambhani was hearing a petition where charges were framed under Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (‘POCSO Act’). The Counsel for the petitioner argued that there is an inordinate and unexplained delay in registering the FIR, and the offence of “penetrative sexual assault” as defined in section 3 of the POCSO Act, and therefore the offence of “aggravated penetrative sexual assault” appearing in section 5 thereof, can never be made-out against a woman.
The Counsel for the State argued that the delay was due to the injuries sustained by the victim and subsequent legal proceedings. It is further argued that the POCSO Act is a gender-neutral legislation and holds perpetrators, regardless of their gender, accountable for sexual offences against minors.
Upon hearing both sides, the court remarked that considering the seriousness of the allegations and the nature of the case, it is not inclined to allow the present revision petition merely on the ground that there was a delay in the registration of the FIR. On the question of gender neutrality of penetrative assault, the court looked at Section 3 of the POCSO Act.
Further, Section 5 relates to aggravated penetrative sexual assault, which refers to ‘whoever’, that is person. The court remarked that there is no reason why the word “person” appearing in section 3 of the POCSO Act should be read as referring only to a ‘male’. It is accordingly held that the acts mentioned in sections 3 and 5 of the POCSO Act are an offence regardless of the gender of the offender provided the acts are committed upon a child. The court further looked at the objectives and the legislative intent behind the POCSO Act.
Based on the above observations, it is held that the term “he” in Section 3 of the Act should not be interpreted in a restrictive manner to imply only a “male.” Instead, it must be understood in its intended broader sense, encompassing any offender, regardless of gender. Consequently, based on a prima facie review of the evidence presented along with the chargesheet, the court held that the offence of “aggravated penetrative sexual assault” is established against the petitioner, even though she is a woman.
Accordingly, the petition is dismissed.
