In this edition of the Court judgments review, we look at the SC’s decision on criminal proceedings on consenting couples post-breakup, illegal demolitions and personal liability of officers, Bombay High Court’s decision on disclosure of marks in the public recruitment process, Telangana High Court’s judgement on the defection of MLAs and disqualification, and Kerala High Court’s judgement regarding Sexual Assault in POCSO Act.
Supreme Court: Mere breakup between consenting adults cannot justify Criminal Proceedings
In Prashant vs. State of NCT of Delhi, the Supreme Court ruled that the breakup of a consensual relationship between two adults cannot serve as grounds for initiating criminal proceedings. It emphasized that a relationship that began with mutual consent cannot later be construed as criminal simply because it did not culminate in marriage.
The two-judge bench comprising Justice B.V. Nagarathna and Justice Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh was hearing an appeal against the order of the Delhi High Court whereby the High Court refused to quash the FIR registered under Sections 376(2)(n) and 506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.
In September 2019, the complainant filed an FIR accusing the appellant of sexually exploiting her under the pretence of marriage and coercing her into repeated sexual relations. She further alleged that the appellant threatened to harm her family if she refused to comply. The appellant sought relief from the Delhi High Court, requesting the quashing of the FIR, which charged him with offences under Sections 376(2)(n) (repeated rape) and 506 (criminal intimidation) of the IPC. However, the High Court concluded that the relationship was non-consensual on the part of the complainant, relying on her FIR and Section 164 CrPC statement to substantiate the charges.
The counsel for the appellant argued that the FIR and medical reports did not disclose any cognizable offence, asserting that the relationship was consensual. It is further claimed the FIR was filed out of personal vengeance after he married in 2019. Conversely, the respondents argued that the appellant’s physical relationship with the complainant was based on a false promise of marriage and accompanied by threats to harm her brother.
During proceedings, it emerged that the appellant had married in 2019, and the complainant had married in 2020. The only question for Supreme Court consideration was whether the FIR, filed in 2019, should be quashed. An analysis of the FIR revealed that the appellant and complainant had maintained a relationship between 2017 and 2019, meeting regularly at parks and each other’s homes. While the complainant alleged coercion, she continued the relationship without filing any criminal complaint during that period, suggesting voluntary consent.
The Court observed that there was no evidence that the appellant had made a false promise of marriage at the outset of the relationship in 2017. Both parties, being educated adults, initially intended to marry, but this plan did not materialize. The Court held that the breakup of a consensual relationship could not retroactively be construed as criminal. The allegations under Sections 376(2)(n) and 506 IPC lacked the essential ingredients required to constitute these offences. The continuation of the prosecution, in this case, was deemed a gross misuse of the legal process.
Further, the apex court in XXXX vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, held that when the relationship between the parties was purely consensual and when the complainant was aware of the consequences of her actions, the ingredients of the offence of rape were not made out. Further, in Pramod Suryabhan Pawar vs. State of Maharashtra, the apex court highlighted that to establish whether the “consent” was vitiated by a “misconception of fact” arising out of a promise to marry, two propositions must be established. The promise of marriage must have been a false promise, given in bad faith and with no intention of being adhered to at the time it was given. The false promise itself must be of immediate relevance or bear a direct nexus to the woman’s decision to engage in the sexual act.
In conclusion, the Supreme Court quashed the FIR and associated criminal proceedings, it also noted that the High Court had erred in its interpretation of the complainant’s lack of consent.
Supreme Court: Property/properties cannot be demolished without following the due process, officials carrying out illegal demolitions will be liable for personal damages.
In Re: Directions in the matter of Demolition of Structures, the Apex Court held that the Right to Shelter is a fundamental right under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution and depriving people of their right to life by removing shelter from their heads, without following due process of law, would be wholly unconstitutional.
A two-judge bench of the Supreme Court, comprising Justice B.R. Gavai and Justice K.V. Vishwanathan, was hearing a batch of writ petitions filed under Article 32 of the Constitution. These petitions raise concerns on behalf of citizens whose residential and commercial properties have been demolished by state authorities without adhering to due process of law, based on their alleged involvement in criminal activities. The petitions also seek strict action against state officials responsible for such illegal demolitions or who may engage in similar actions in the future.
The central issue in these petitions is whether properties belonging to individuals accused or even convicted of criminal offences can be demolished without following the due process of law. To address this question, the Court examined the principles of the rule of law, constitutional protections that shield individuals from arbitrary state actions, and the importance of fairness within the criminal justice system. This fairness principle emphasizes that legal processes should not presume the guilt of the accused. Additionally, the Court considered the concepts of separation of powers and the doctrine of public trust, which underline the accountability of government officials in upholding the rule of law.
Regarding the rule of law, the Court, in Smt. Indira Nehru Gandhi vs. Shri Raj Narain, established that this principle forms part of the Constitution’s basic structure. Numerous judgments affirm that the rule of law acts as a safeguard against the arbitrary use of state power, ensuring that government actions are guided by established legal principles rather than discretion. This foundational concept is critical in evaluating the legitimacy of the demolitions at issue.
On the Separation of Powers, a nine-judge bench of the Supreme Court in I.R. Coelho (Dead) by LRs. vs. State of T.N. recognized this doctrine as a system of “checks and balances” designed to prevent tyranny. The Court emphasized the risks associated with legislative, executive, and judicial powers being concentrated in a single organ of government. It underscored that the judiciary has the duty to determine whether any branch has overstepped its constitutional boundaries.
Regarding the Doctrine of Public Trust and Public Accountability, the Court has consistently held that public officers and officials must adhere to principles of public trust and accountability in their functions. In Centre for Public Interest Litigation & Another vs. Union of India & Another, the Court ruled that public officials are accountable for both their inactions and irresponsible actions. It emphasized the need to fix responsibility on erring officers to ensure a transparent and accountable administration that serves the public interest.
On the Rights of the accused, the court reiterated that even the incarcerated individuals, whether accused, undertrial, or convicts, have certain rights, as any other citizen. They have a right to dignity and cannot be subjected to any cruel or inhuman treatment. Further, it is held that no one can take away the fundamental rights of prisoners or the accused. The right to shelter is one of the facets of Article 21. Depriving people of their right to life by removing shelter from their heads, in our considered view, would be wholly unconstitutional.
Considering all the factors, the Supreme Court emphasized that the image of a bulldozer demolishing a building without adhering to the basic principles of natural justice and due process evokes a sense of lawlessness, where “might was right.” In this context, the Court firmly concluded that a person, merely accused or even convicted of a crime, cannot be subjected to the extreme punishment of having their property demolished. The answer, the Court declared, is an unequivocal ‘No’.
To address concerns about the arbitrary exercise of power by state officials, the Court issued several directions under its powers granted by Article 142 of the Constitution. Key directives include:
- Show Cause Notice: Demolitions should not occur without a prior show cause notice, which must be served in accordance with local municipal laws or within 15 days, whichever is later.
- Details in the Notice: The notice should include:
- Nature of the alleged unauthorized construction.
- Specific violations and grounds for demolition.
- A list of documents the recipient must submit with their response.
- A date for the personal hearing and the name of the designated authority conducting it.
- Personal Hearing: The designated authority must provide an opportunity for a personal hearing.
- Final Order: After the hearing, a final order must be issued, containing:
- The arguments of the notice and reasons for any disagreement.
- Whether the violation can be compounded, with reasons if it cannot.
- Consequences of Violation: Any violation of these directions will lead to contempt proceedings and possible prosecution.
- Liability for Illegal Demolition: If a demolition is found to violate the Court’s orders, the responsible officer(s) will be held personally liable for restoring the demolished property at their own expense, along with paying damages.
These directives aim to prevent arbitrary actions and ensure that demolitions, if necessary, follow the due process of law.
Bombay HC: Disclosure of marks in public recruitment process does not infringe on public interest or privacy
In Onkar Kalmankar vs. Public Information Officer, the Bombay High Court ruled that disclosing marks in a public recruitment process is not solely personal information. The Court stated that such disclosure is relevant to the public interest and does not unjustly invade an individual’s privacy. The Court emphasized that transparency in this matter serves the greater public interest by promoting accountability and addressing concerns about potential wrongdoings in the recruitment process.
The brief facts of the case are as follows: The petitioner applied for the Junior Clerk position in the Pune District Court in March 2018, participated in the recruitment process, and was ranked 289 in the Marathi typing test and 250 in the English typing test. After attending the interview, he found he was not listed among the selected candidates and was not informed of his non-selection. On 20 February 2019, the petitioner filed an RTI request seeking details of his marks, the marks of candidates ranked 1-363, and the criteria used for selection.
On 6 March 2019, the Public Information Officer (PIO) denied the information, citing Rule 13(e) of the Maharashtra District Courts RTI Rules, 2009, which deemed such information “confidential.” The petitioner appealed, but the First Appellate Authority upheld the decision, stating the recruitment process was confidential. The petitioner later filed a Second Appeal, but it was dismissed on 27 April 2021. He then filed this petition challenging the decisions of the PIO, First Appellate Authority, and Second Appellate Authority.
During the pendency of the petition, the petitioner received information regarding his own marks. However, he argued that knowing the marks of other candidates was crucial to assessing his relative performance. The PIO and appellate authorities defended their decisions, citing Section 8(1)(j) and Section 11 of the RTI Act, which exempt personal information from disclosure. They also noted that the petitioner had requested additional information, such as the names of the interviewers, which was not permissible.
The court considered the issue of disclosing marks in public recruitment. It ruled that the marks obtained by candidates in a public selection process, such as for the Junior Clerk position, are related to public activity and interest. Disclosure of these marks would not infringe on privacy or confidentiality, as the process was public from the start. The Court emphasized that transparency and accountability in the recruitment process were crucial to maintain public trust and prevent doubts about the fairness of the process.
The Court also clarified that personal information, such as marks, could only be withheld if it related to an individual’s private matters without any connection to the public interest. However, in this case, the public interest in transparency outweighed any privacy concerns, making the disclosure of marks justified.
The Court also emphasized that disclosing the marks would not compromise the candidates’ privacy, as the marks were not confidential and would not undermine the integrity of the examination. Withholding such information, even if based on unreasonable concerns, only fuels unnecessary doubts, which is detrimental to promoting transparency and accountability in public recruitment processes. The Court reaffirmed the principle that “sunlight is the best disinfectant” in the context of the RTI Act.
Accordingly, the Court ruled that the marks of all candidates in the recruitment process should be made public to ensure transparency and accountability. The request to withhold the marks was denied, and the appeal against non-disclosure was dismissed.
Kerala HC: Any act with sexual intent involving physical contact without penetration constitutes sexual assault under the POCSO Act
In Ajith Prasad Edacherry vs. State of Kerala, the Kerala High Court held that any other act with sexual intent which involves physical contact without penetration is also sexual assault under sections 9(f),(m) and 10 under the POCSO Act, 2012.
The brief facts of the case are as follows. The accused filed the Criminal Revision petition challenging the Special Court’s order for the trial of offences under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act, 2012 in Kasaragod. In this instance, the accused—who happens to be the teacher at St. Paul’s A.U.P. School in Thrikkaripur—is accused of sexually assaulting a juvenile victim who was in the first grade and beating him when he ignored his orders. The precise accusation, as stated in the victim’s 164 statement and the FIS, is that the accused took him to the staff room and told him to lie on his body. The victim was beaten on the leg when he refused, and when he was called upon to lay on his body once more out of fear of more abuse, he did so. Accordingly, the prosecution claims that offences under Sections 9(f), (m), and 10 of the POCSO Act as well as Section 23 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 were committed. This Court determined that an offence under Section 23 of the JJ Act is prima facie established earlier and instructed the Special Court to determine if the elements necessary to establish an offence under Sections 9(f) and (m) of the POCSO Act have been established in order to frame a charge. The counsel for the petitioner challenged the aforementioned order by restating the victim’s statements that were recorded under Sections 161 and 164 of the Cr.P.C contending that the only allegation was that by placing the child on his body while he was also lying on the desk, the petitioner/accused had made physical contact with the minor victim.
In rejecting the discharge petition, the Special Court cited Sections 29 and 30 of the POCSO Act, which address presumptions about culpable mental condition.
As a result, the petitioner’s counsel submitted that none of the offences under POCSO were made out. The Public Prosecutor argued in support of the learnt Special Judge’s order that the Special Judge addressed the overt acts within the scope of the final section of Section 7 of the POCSO Act, which states that whoever does any other act with sexual intent which involves physical contact without penetration is said to commit sexual assault.
In this case, the accused, who is the victim’s teacher, caused physical contact with the child by making the victim lie on his body while he himself was lying on the desk. This action establishes physical contact between the accused and the minor child. Additionally, the issue of culpable mental state is addressed under Section 30 of the POCSO Act, which mandates that in any prosecution involving an offence under the Act that requires a culpable mental state, the Special Court must presume the existence of such a mental state. However, it shall be the defence of the accused to prove that he/she did not possess the requisite mental state in relation to the alleged offence. Accordingly, the revision petition was dismissed.
Telangana HC: Speaker must decide the disqualification petitions filed by the writ petitioners within a reasonable time, what would be the reasonable time depends in the facts and circumstances of each case.
In The Telangana Legislative Assembly vs. Alleti Maheshwar Reddy and Others, the Telangana High Court held that the Speaker has the Authority to decide the disqualification petitions, who exercises the powers under the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution of India andthe Speaker of the Assembly is required to decide the disqualification petitions within a reasonable time. What would be the reasonable time depends on the facts and circumstances of each case.
On 15 March 2024, Respondent No. 5 voluntarily resigned from the Bharat Rashtra Samithi (BRS) and joined the Indian National Congress (INC). Subsequently, on 1 July 2024, Respondent No. 1, along with other Members of the Legislative Assembly, submitted a petition to the Speaker of the Telangana Legislative Assembly seeking the disqualification of Respondent No. 5 under Paragraph 2(1) of the Tenth Schedule, read with Article 191(2) of the Constitution of India, and Rule 6 of the Members of Legislative Assembly (Disqualification on the Ground of Defection) Rules, 1986. However, the Speaker did not act on the disqualification petition.
As a result, a writ petition was filed on 9 July 2024, challenging the Speaker’s inaction and seeking a writ of mandamus directing the Speaker to decide the disqualification petition within three months. The Single Judge, relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Keisham Meghachandra Singh vs. Speaker, Manipur Legislative Assembly, issued an order on 9 September 2024. The order directed the Secretary of the Telangana Legislative Assembly to immediately present the disqualification petition to the Speaker and schedule a hearing within four weeks. The Secretary was also instructed to communicate the schedule to the Registrar (Judicial) of the High Court. In the event of non-compliance, the matter would be reopened suo motu for further orders. The writ petitions were disposed of accordingly.
These intra-court appeals arise from the above factual background. The central issue in these appeals is whether the High Court, in its judicial review capacity, can direct the Speaker to act on disqualification petitions. It is noted that this question is currently under consideration by a five-judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court. The appellants argue that judicial directions fixing a timeline for the Speaker interfere with the Speaker’s functions, despite the Supreme Court’s authority under Article 142 of the Constitution, which does not serve as a binding precedent under Article 141.
The appellants contend that unless the Speaker’s inaction is vitiated by mala fides, arbitrariness, or violations of constitutional provisions, judicial interference is unwarranted. On the other hand, the petitioners argue that the Speaker’s failure to decide disqualification petitions violates constitutional mandates and is subject to judicial review. They assert that the Speaker, acting as a tribunal while deciding such petitions, is subject to the High Court’s supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution.
The High Court referred to several Supreme Court rulings, including Kihoto Hollohan vs. Zachillhu, Rajendra Singh Rana vs. Swami Prasad Maurya, S.A. Sampath Kumar vs. Kale Yadaiah, Keisham Meghachandra Singh vs. Speaker, Manipur Legislative Assembly, and Subhash Desai vs. Principal Secretary, Government of Maharashtra. These decisions emphasize that the Speaker while exercising powers under the Tenth Schedule, is a high constitutional authority bound by the rule of law and subject to judicial review on limited grounds.
It is held that the Speaker is responsible for deciding disqualification petitions within a reasonable timeframe. However, what constitutes a “reasonable time” must be determined based on the specific facts and circumstances of each case.
Accordingly, the common order passed by the Single Judge is set aside and the speaker must decide the disqualification petitions filed by the writ petitioners within a reasonable time. The writ appeals are disposed of.
