In this edition of the Court judgments review, we look at Allahabad HC’s order that the second wife cannot maintain proceedings under Section 498A or the Dowry Prohibition Act when the marriage is a nullity, Andhra Pradesh HC’s order that the accused failing to produce mobile phones during the investigation cannot be deemed as non-cooperation, SC’s order that children cannot resume Indian citizenship under Section 8(2) if parents acquired foreign citizenship which results in automatic termination of their Indian citizenship, among others.
Allahabad HC: Second wife cannot maintain proceedings under Section 498A or the Dowry Prohibition Act
The case Maan Singh and others vs. State of UP and another is an appeal before the Allahabad High Court challenging the proceedings involving allegations of harassment for dowry. The complainant, Savita Devi, claimed that she married Maan Singh in 2012, and initially had no disputes for four years. However, she later alleged that the applicants began demanding dowry, threatening her with abandonment if their demands were not met. She claimed she was forcibly taken away and left in her village. She further alleged Maan Singh had misrepresented his first wife’s death to marry her.
The appellant’s counsel argued that since Savita was the second wife, she cannot maintain proceedings under Section 498A IPC. They also argued that since the marriage was a nullity, the provisions of the Dowry Prohibition Act would not apply. The state’s counsel argued that the other charges under IPC sections 323, 504, and 506 are still maintainable, even though the provisions of the Dowry Prohibition Act are inapplicable.
Referring to a Supreme Court judgement, Justice Anish Kumar Gupta of the Allahabad High Court observed that since it was a second marriage, the charges under Section 498A and the Dowry Prohibition Act were not maintainable as the marriage itself was a nullity. Further, it also ruled that the allegation of dowry demands, and harassment were general and vague. Consequently, the court quashed the entire proceedings against the applicants.
SC: Quantified disability per se will not disentitle a candidate with benchmark disability from being considered for admission to educational institutions
In the case, Omkar vs. Union of India, the petitioner, Omkar has a speech and language disability, certified at 45% (in some reports, it was mentioned as 44%). He applied for the NEET (UG) 2024 exam and qualified. He sought admission to the MBBS course under the Persons with Disabilities and OBC categories. However, the Designated Disability Certification Centre ruled him ineligible based on the National Medical Council’s regulations, which state that individuals with 40% or more disability cannot pursue medical courses. His name appeared at rank 42091 on the provisional merit list.
He challenged the Graduate Medical Education Regulation, 1997, which prohibited individuals with disabilities of 40% or more from enrolling in the MBBS course. The petitioner contended that the regulations were unconstitutional and did not accurately reflect his capabilities. He added that the regulations were overly broad and violated his rights. He highlighted that he did not possess functional impairments that would hinder his ability to complete the course.
Justices BR Gavai, Aravind Kumar, and KV Viswanathan noted that disability assessment boards must consider the individual’s capacity to study, not just the quantified disability. It noted that having a quantified disability alone does not automatically disqualify a candidate with a benchmark disability from being considered for admission to educational institutions. Directing that the petitioner be admitted to the MBBS program, the Supreme Court Bench stated that the Disability Assessment Board should clearly indicate whether a candidate’s disability will impact their ability to complete the course. If they determine that a candidate isn’t eligible because of their disability, they must provide an explanation. It added that an inclusive attitude must be adopted to ensure equal participation of disabled individuals in society. The judgment also highlighted notable Indians who overcame disabilities, such as Sudha Chandran, Arunima Singh, Boniface Prabhu, and Dr Satendra Singh and stated that the world would be poorer without contributions from figures like Homer, Milton, Mozart, and Beethoven.
SC: Article 29 does not guarantee right to TV channel for Sindhi language
In Sindhi Sangat vs. Union of India, the petitioner had filed a plea before the Delhi High Court seeking the establishment of a separate 24-hour Sindhi language channel on Doordarshan, arguing it was a constitutional obligation. However, the High Court had dismissed the plea. An affidavit from Doordarshan explained that their language policy prioritizes broadcasting in the principal language of the region and that Sindhi is not the principal language in any state. Following this, the petitioner approached the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court Bench of Chief Justice of India DY Chandrachud, Justices JB Pardiwala and Manoj Misra concluded that no mandamus could be issued to create a separate Sindhi channel, as the right under Article 29 of the Constitution does not guarantee such a channel. Article 29 of the Indian Constitution deals with the protection of interests of minorities including their language. The Court cited several reasons as cited by Doordarshan: the estimated annual cost of Rs. 19.51 crores for maintaining a dedicated channel was unsustainable given the limited audience of about 26 lakh Sindhi speakers. Additionally, it noted that Doordarshan already broadcasts Sindhi programs on regional channels. The Court dismissed the plea stating that the potential viewership for a Sindhi channel was insufficient to justify its establishment.
Andhra Pradesh HC: If the accused fails to produce mobile phones during the investigation, it cannot be deemed as non-cooperation
The case Avuthu Srinivas Reddy vs. the Station House Officer before the Andhra Pradesh High Court is a bail petition. In 2021, a violent incident occurred at the TDP office in Andhra Pradesh, where a mob of about 70 individuals associated with the then-ruling YSR Congress Party allegedly attacked TDP members. An FIR was registered that evening, citing multiple offences under the IPC. Following the investigation, the police identified several suspects and gathered electronic evidence, leading to the proposal of additional charges. Two individuals, N. Suresh Babu and Avuthu Srinivasa Reddy, sought bail, claiming they were falsely implicated due to their political affiliations.
The state opposed their bail, citing the failure to produce their mobile phones that could provide crucial information about the incident as one of the reasons. The petitioners argued that their inability to provide the phones should not be seen as a lack of cooperation, especially since they were protected under the right against self-incrimination. They argued that the investigation agency could not compel them to provide evidence that could potentially incriminate them.
A single judge bench of Justice Dr. V R K Krupa Sagar referred to previous judgments and held that the failure to produce mobile phones during the investigation cannot be deemed as non-cooperation by the accused as the accused is protected under Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India. He added that the investigation could continue without the phones. The court also noted that nearly 34 co-accused had been granted bail. It considered the occupations and residences of the petitioners, determining that their long-standing presence in the community indicated they were unlikely to evade the legal process. Given these factors and the nature of the crime, the court concluded that the continued detention of the petitioners was unnecessary and granted their request for bail.
SC: Children cannot resume Indian citizenship under Section 8(2) if parents acquired foreign citizenship which results in automatic termination of their Indian citizenship
Pranav Srinivasan sought Indian citizenship, claiming lineage from Indian-born grandparents and parents. His parents adopted Singaporean citizenship in 1998, and Pranav was born in Singapore in 1999. After his parents renounced Indian citizenship in 2012, Pranav applied to resume his citizenship in 2017. Initially stalled due to unpaid fees, his application was ultimately rejected by the Ministry of Home Affairs. A High Court ruling in his favour was later appealed by the Union of India, but the appeal was dismissed. The Ministry reiterated his ineligibility in 2024, following which Pranav filed a writ petition (WP 123 of 2024) in the Supreme Court. The issue in the writ petition and the appeal, Union of India vs. Pranav Srinivasan is whether he can regain Indian citizenship.
According to the Union of India, Pranav’s parents voluntarily acquired Singaporean citizenship in 1998, resulting in the automatic termination of their Indian citizenship under Section 9(1) of the Citizenship Act. Further, Section 8(2) could not apply, as the cessation of citizenship occurred by order of law and not through voluntary renunciation. Also, Pranav did not qualify for citizenship under Section 5(1)(b), since neither he nor his parents were born in undivided India.
Pranav argued that he was entitled to resume his Indian citizenship under Section 8(2) of the Citizenship Act because his parents were originally Indian citizens. He also claimed eligibility for citizenship under Article 8 of the Constitution, on grounds that his grandparents were born in undivided India.
The Supreme Court Bench of Justice Abhay Oka and Justice Augustine George Masih held that Section 8(2) did not apply to children of individuals who have acquired foreign citizenship when such cessation occurs by operation of law. The court further noted that accepting Pranav’s interpretation of Article 8 could lead to absurd outcomes, allowing individuals to claim citizenship based solely on ancestry. Moreover, the court found Pranav ineligible for citizenship under Section 5(1)(b), as both he and his parents were born after India’s independence and did not meet the criteria outlined in that section.
Allowing the Union of India’s appeal and dismissing the High Court’s erroneous decision, the Supreme Court acknowledged the possibility for Pranav to apply for citizenship under Section 5(1)(f). It also declined to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 142 to grant him citizenship, emphasizing the importance of adhering to the clear statutory language of the Citizenship Act.
