In this edition of the Court Judgments Review, we examine a range of significant rulings, including Supreme Court decisions on marriages existing only on paper, the dowry in Muslim marriages, and the legality of leasing forest land without prior approval under the Forest Conservation Act. We also look at the Madhya Pradesh High Court ruling on the grant of bail under the POCSO Act and a Rajasthan High Court decision concerning the cancellation of an auction.
Supreme Court: Pendency of matrimonial litigation for a long duration only leads to perpetuity of marriage on paper
The Supreme Court, in N vs. A, held that no useful purpose shall be served by keeping the matrimonial litigation pending in Court without granting relief to the parties. It also noted that the institution of marriage is rooted in dignity, mutual respect and shared companionship, and when these foundational aspects are irreparably lost, forcing a couple to remain legally bound serves no purpose.
The parties married in August 2000 at Shillong and were colleagues at the Life Insurance Corporation of India. Marital disputes arose soon after, and the wife left the matrimonial home in 2001. The husband filed for divorce on the grounds of desertion in 2003, but the suit was dismissed as premature. A fresh petition filed in 2007 resulted in a decree of divorce by the trial court in 2010.
The wife challenged this decree, and the Guwahati High Court set it aside in 2011, holding that desertion was not proved and that the wife had reasonable cause to live separately. The husband then approached the Supreme Court. The appellant husband argued that the parties had been living separately for over two decades with no chance of reconciliation. He contended that the marriage had irretrievably broken down and continued existence of such a relationship caused cruelty. He relied on precedents recognising long separation as mental cruelty.
The respondent contended that she was forced to leave due to harassment and pressure to quit her job. She denied any intention to desert and maintained that she was willing to resume matrimonial life. She argued that irretrievable breakdown alone is not a statutory ground for divorce.
Upon hearing both parties, the Court noted that the parties had lived apart for 24 years, had no children, and all mediation efforts had failed. The court observed that prolonged separation with no hope of reconciliation amounts to mental cruelty. The Court emphasised that rigid application of fault theory should not perpetuate a “marriage only on paper.
Further, relying on earlier judgements in Naveen Kohli vs. Neelu Kohli, Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh, and Shilpa Sailesh vs. Varun Sreenivasan, the Court held that its power under Article 142 is not constrained by statutory grounds or fault-based doctrines.
Accordingly, the appeal is allowed.
Supreme Court: Where dowry replaces or overshadows Mehr, women lose an important bargaining tool and face greater economic vulnerability.
In State of UP vs. Ajmal Beg etc., the Supreme Court allowed the appeals filed by the State of Uttar Pradesh and restored the conviction of Ajmal Beg and Jamila for offences under Sections 304-B and 498-A IPC and Sections 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961.
The deceased, Nasrin, was married to Ajmal Beg for just over a year before she died of extensive burn injuries in June 2001. The prosecution alleged that she was repeatedly harassed for dowry demands of a motorcycle, a colour television, and ₹15,000. Despite the father’s inability to meet these demands, they were reiterated a day prior to her death. On the following day, she was set ablaze in her matrimonial home.
An FIR was lodged under Sections 498-A and 304-B IPC and the Dowry Prohibition Act. The Trial Court convicted Ajmal and his mother, Jamila, sentencing Ajmal to life imprisonment. The Allahabad High Court reversed the conviction and acquitted them, leading to the present appeals by the State.
The State argued that consistent testimonies of the deceased’s family clearly established dowry harassment and that the High Court wrongly ignored the presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act. The accused contended that witness inconsistencies, absence of eyewitnesses, and their poor financial condition disproved dowry demands.
The Supreme Court held that minor inconsistencies could not overshadow the consistent evidence establishing dowry demand and harassment “soon before death.” It reaffirmed that once the ingredients of Section 304-B IPC are met, the presumption under Section 113-B automatically applies and must be rebutted by the accused.
The Court rejected the High Court’s reasoning that poverty negated dowry demand, observing that such logic was legally unsound. It emphasised that dowry demand can be made at any time before or after marriage and that social realities cannot dilute statutory protections.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s acquittal and restored the Trial Court’s conviction and sentence.
Supreme Court: Granting permission to cultivate the forest land would essentially require clearing of forest and such a course of action violates Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980
The Supreme Court, in State of Karnataka & Ors. vs. Gandhi Jeevan Collective Farming Co-Operative Society Limited, held that forest land cannot be diverted for agricultural or other non-forest purposes without prior approval of the Central Government, and such action violates the FCA, 1980.
The brief facts of the case are as follows: by Government Orders dated 17 March 1973 and 30 June 1976, the State of Karnataka leased out an extent of 134 acres and 6 guntas of land situated in Benachi and Tumarikoppa villages of Kalaghatagi Taluk, Dharwad District, to the respondent-Cooperative Society for agricultural purposes for a period of ten years commencing from 30 June 1976.
During the lease period, members of the respondent society cleared forest growth and brought the land under cultivation. Upon expiry of the lease, the State declined to grant any extension and terminated the lease by order dated 13 March 1985. This termination was challenged by the society through writ petitions, both of which were dismissed.
Subsequently, the society instituted a civil suit seeking protection of possession, which was partly decreed, restraining the Forest Department from dispossessing the society except in accordance with law. Appeals filed by the State up to the second appellate stage were dismissed, with observations that eviction must be carried out through lawful means.
The Forest Department initiated proceedings under the Karnataka Forest Act and passed an eviction order on 22 June 2004. The society’s appeal against this order was rejected, and possession of the land was taken over by the Forest Department on 23 January 2007.
The State asserted that the land in question is classified as forest land and relied upon binding directions of this Court prohibiting de-reservation or non-forest use without prior approval under the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980.
Upon consideration, this Court held that the original grant of lease itself was illegal, having resulted in large-scale deforestation. Since forest land cannot be diverted for agricultural or other non-forest purposes without prior approval of the Central Government, no further indulgence could be granted. The High Court’s direction permitting consideration of the continuation of the lease was found unsustainable. Accordingly, the appeal was allowed, and the State was directed to restore the forest land by undertaking reforestation within twelve months.
Madhya Pradesh High Court: Subsequent marriage or birth of child is no ground to dilute POCSO Act offences
The Madhya Pradesh High Court, in Sajan Bhatt vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors., held that subsequent events of marriage during bail or birth of a child out of the said wedlock are immaterial to show indulgence in terms of the provisions contained in the POCSO Act, 2012.
The appeal challenges the judgment passed by the Special Judge (POCSO Act), Narmadapuram, whereby the appellant was convicted under Section 5(l) read with Section 6 of the POCSO Act and sentenced to 20 years’ rigorous imprisonment with a fine of ₹2,000, with a default sentence of two months’ RI. The appellant was acquitted of charges under Section 376(2)(n) IPC and the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989.
The appellant contended that the victim was 17 years old and a consenting party, and further pleaded leniency on the ground that the appellant married the victim during the trial while on bail and a child was born from the wedlock, leaving the victim without family support.
The prosecution opposed the plea, asserting that consent of a minor is immaterial under the law and that subsequent marriage or childbirth cannot dilute liability under the POCSO Act.
The Court noted that the victim’s date of birth was consistently established as 19 June 2006 through school records, birth certificate, and supporting testimony, thereby proving that she was below 18 years at the time of the incident. Medical evidence also reflected her age as 17 years.
The Court held that the victim squarely fell within the definition of “child” under Section 2(d) of the POCSO Act and that repeated sexual assault attracted Section 5(l) read with Section 6. It categorically ruled that subsequent marriage during bail or the birth of a child is legally irrelevant in POCSO offences.
Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.
Rajasthan High Court: Auction cannot be cancelled just because there is only a single bidder.
The Rajasthan High Court, in Smt. Kamla Jain vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors, held that an auction cannot be cancelled merely on account of “lack of competition” and “non-realisation of full potential value” and because there is only a single bidder.
The petitioner, Smt. Kamla Jain approached the Rajasthan High Court, challenging the cancellation of her highest bid for a commercial plot in Udaipur by the Rajasthan Housing Board. The impugned orders dated 09 July 2025, 12 July 2025, and 14 July 2025 cancelled the bid on the ground of “lack of competition,” despite the petitioner having quoted a price higher than the reserve rate and having complied with all auction conditions.
The petitioner participated in the e-auction conducted between 28 April 2025 and 30 April 2025 for Plot No. 01 under the South Extension Scheme, Udaipur, measuring 2518 sq. meters. She submitted the highest and sole bid of ₹75,500 per sq. meter against the reserve price of ₹75,000 per sq. meter and deposited the required 2% EMD, followed by payment of the remaining amount to complete 15% of the bid value within the stipulated time. Despite full compliance, no allotment was issued, and the bid was later cancelled without prior notice.
The Counsel for the petitioner argued that the cancellation was arbitrary and contrary to the Rajasthan Housing Board’s policy dated 03 September 2020, which permits cancellation only in cases of non-payment of stipulated instalments and does not mandate rejection merely because there was a single bidder. The Counsel placed their reliance on the earlier decision of the Court, which had upheld the validity of single-bid auctions. The said judgment had been affirmed by the Division Bench and later by the Supreme Court. Counsel for the respondents could not dispute that the issue was squarely covered by the aforesaid precedent.
In view of the settled position of law, the High Court allowed the writ petition. The petitioner was directed to deposit the refunded bid amount and the balance auction price within three months, upon which the Housing Board was directed to complete the allotment and execute the necessary conveyance deeds without charging interest for the delay caused due to litigation.
