In this edition of the court judgments review, we examine the Supreme Court’s ruling on coverage within Consumer Protection Act and also on growing drug usage in India, Punjab & Haryana High Court’s judgement on compromises in cyber offences, Madras High Court’s ruling on discrimination on caste lines in matters of faith and tradition, and Patna High Court’s judgement on election canvassing by contestants who are jailed.
Supreme Court: Entity involved in the purchase of goods/ services having a nexus with generation of profits cannot be considered a ‘consumer’ under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986.
The Supreme Court, in M/s Poly Medicure Ltd. vs. M/S Brillio Technologies Pvt Ltd, held that if any purchase transaction has a nexus with the generation of profits, it would be treated as one for a commercial purpose, and such parties cannot be considered ‘consumer’ under Section 2(1)(d) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986.
M/s Poly Medicure Ltd., a company engaged in import and export of medical devices, purchased the software “Brillio Opti Suite” from M/s Brillio Technologies Pvt. Ltd. for automating export–import documentation processes. The appellant alleged that the software malfunctioned despite payment of licence and development charges and therefore sought a refund and interest before the State Consumer Commission. The Commission dismissed the complaint, holding that the purchase was for a commercial purpose. The National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (NCDRC) affirmed this decision, leading to the present appeal before the Supreme Court.
The appellant contended that the software was purchased for self-use and not for resale. Relying on Lilavati Kirtilal Mehta Medical Trust vs. Unique Shanti Developers and Ors and Sunil Kohli and Anr. vs. Purearth Infrastructure Ltd, it argued that goods or services used for internal functioning without directly generating profit should not be treated as commercial. It maintained that the software was merely a facilitative tool and therefore the company should qualify as a “consumer.”
The respondent countered that the software was customised to assist core business functions such as export documentation, tracking consignments, managing forex cover, and handling government-scheme benefits, activities directly connected to profit generation. It argued that the transaction was a typical business-to-business commercial engagement, outside consumer jurisdiction. Reliance was placed on precedents, including National Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Harsolia Motors and Ors and Shrikant G. Mantri vs. Punjab National Bank.
On hearing both parties, the Court reiterated that determining “commercial purpose” depends on the dominant intention behind the transaction. While individuals may fall within the “self-employment” exception, companies purchasing goods to enhance business efficiency and profits do not. The Court emphasised that automation of business processes, such as through the software in question, has a direct nexus with profit maximisation, bringing the transaction squarely within commercial purpose.
Accordingly, the order of the NCDRC was upheld.
Supreme Court: There has been a concerning increase in drug abuse among the youth, State has the responsibility to address and protect younger people from such menace.
In Union of India vs. Namdeo Ashruba Nakade, the Supreme Court held that in India, the alleged sins of an accused cannot be visited on his brother or other family members. The Court further expressed concerns over the growing substance abuse among the younger population and remarked that the State has the responsibility to address this menace at the root and protect the vulnerable.
The present appeal challenges the Andhra Pradesh High Court’s order granting bail to the respondent for offences under Section 8(c) read with Sections 20, 28 and 29 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (NDPS) Act,1985. The case arises from the seizure of 731.075 kilograms of Ganja, well above the commercial-quantity threshold, from a lorry allegedly owned and driven by the respondent. The High Court granted bail on the grounds that the investigation was complete, the charge sheet had been filed, charges were yet to be framed, and that the respondent’s presence during trial was assured through an undertaking from his elder brother, a Sepoy in the Indian Army.
The counsel for the State argued that the High Court failed to comply with the mandatory requirements of Section 37 of the NDPS Act, which strictly limits the grant of bail in commercial quantity cases punishable with a minimum of ten years’ imprisonment. Citing Narcotics Control Bureau vs. Kashif (2024), the Counsel submitted that courts must expressly record satisfaction that the accused is not guilty and unlikely to reoffend, findings absent in the order. The State contended that the High Court diluted statutory safeguards and overlooked the gravity of the offence.
The respondent submitted that he had been in custody for nearly two years and that the High Court rightly considered the delay in the commencement of the trial. Counsel also referred to the brother’s sworn undertaking to ensure the respondent’s appearance and the respondent’s willingness to remain electronically traceable, asserting that flight risk was minimal.
The Supreme Court highlighted the growing national and global drug-abuse crisis and reiterated the severe societal harm caused by narcotics. Observing that the seized quantity was far beyond commercial limits and that the vehicle allegedly contained specially fabricated cavities, the Court found prima facie involvement in organised trafficking. It held that the High Court had ignored the mandatory twin conditions of Section 37 and that the custody period was not excessive in the context of offences carrying 10–20 years’ imprisonment.
The apex court further held that the brother’s undertaking was deemed irrelevant, as criminal responsibility cannot be shifted to relatives in India. The Court therefore set aside the bail order and directed the respondent to surrender.
Punjab and Haryana HC: Cyber frauds inflict grave systemic harm on public finances, making private compromises in such cases detrimental to broader law-enforcement interests.
In Badri Mandal & others vs. State of Haryana and another, the Punjab and Haryana High Court held that judicial responsibility is accentuated in cases involving heinous or egregious offences, where the broader societal interest outweighs private settlements, and cyber frauds are one such area of systemic damage that cannot be quashed if parties compromise on mutual accord.
The complainant, Divya, employed as an accountant, discovered seven unauthorised transactions amounting to ₹14,83,696 withdrawn from her HDFC Bank account without any OTP or alerts. Investigation revealed that the funds were siphoned to fraudulent accounts opened using fake documents through a fake website. Based on her online complaint, FIR was registered under various provisions of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), 2023.
The accused-petitioners sought quashing of the FIR on the basis of a compromise deed. Statements of parties confirming the settlement were recorded before the Magistrate. The petitioners argued that they were falsely implicated and that the dispute had been amicably resolved. They contended that the complainant no longer wished to pursue the case and that continuing the prosecution would serve no useful purpose.
The State opposed the quashing, stressing that cyber fraud is a serious offence affecting public confidence in digital banking. Even if the complainant had settled the matter, the broader societal implications warranted the continuation of prosecution. The State urged judicial caution in exercising inherent powers under Section 528 BNSS.
The Court reviewed landmark precedents on quashing of criminal proceedings based on compromise, such as Gian Singh vs. State of Punjab and another, Narinder Singh vs. State of Punjab, Parbatbhai Aahir @ Parbatbhai Bhimsinhbhai Karmur and Ors. vs. State of Gujarat and anr, and State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Laxmi Narayan and others. The Court emphasised that offences of financial and cyber fraud impact the public at large, eroding trust in digital systems. Such offences cannot be treated as private disputes capable of resolution through compromise.
The Court further noted that the allegations in the FIR constituted a cyber fraud “simpliciter,” not a mere private financial disagreement dressed up as a cybercrime to exaggerate seriousness. Therefore, quashing would undermine public interest and judicial responsibility.
Accordingly, the High Court dismissed the petition for quashing the FIR. It directed that the investigation and trial proceed strictly in accordance with the law and clarified that its observations would not prejudice the merits of the case.
Madras HC: Faith cannot be fenced by caste or creed, and divinity cannot be confined by human prejudice.
The Madras High Court, in Selvaraj vs. The District Collector and Others, held that no street is unworthy of the chariot or the god it carries. God never discriminates, and so discrimination cannot be wrapped in the sanctity of tradition.
Selvaraj, a Scheduled Caste resident of Puthagaram Village, filed a writ petition seeking a mandamus to allow him and his community members to enter the Muthu Kolakki Amman Temple and participate in all rituals, including the annual temple car festival. He alleged that upper-caste residents had historically prevented Dalit residents from temple entry and blocked the temple car from entering their colony despite multiple representations and peace committee meetings.
Following an earlier interim order, the Court directed a field inspection. The District Collector filed a detailed status report confirming that an extended car route through the Dalit Colony was feasible.
The petitioner argued that the caste-based denial of temple entry and exclusion from ritual practices violated Articles 14, 15, 17 and 25 of the Constitution. He highlighted repeated resistance by upper-caste residents and claimed ongoing discriminatory practices during temple festivities.
The State authorities contested the allegation of any official restriction, asserting that no community, including the petitioner’s, was barred from entering or worshipping in the temple. They relied on the District Collector’s report affirming the feasibility of the extended route. The counsel for private respondents argued that the traditional temple car route had remained unchanged for decades, and altering it could trigger limitless similar demands from other groups. They insisted that their resistance was based on custom, not caste discrimination.
Upon hearing the parties, the Court reaffirmed that Article 17 abolishes untouchability “in true letter and spirit,” holding that no individual or group may dictate who can worship a deity. Faith, the Court stated, cannot be confined by caste boundaries: “God does not reside in certain streets alone.”
The Judge noted that the private respondents’ argument of “tradition” could not override constitutional guarantees. Since the District Collector’s route study confirmed both technical and operational feasibility, objections premised on custom were rejected.
Patna HC: Allowing a person with criminal antecedents of serious nature to canvass in elections, would not be in larger interest of the society.
In Rit Lal Yadav vs. State of Bihar and others, the Patna High Court held that a balance should be struck between the rights of citizens who deserve a clean India and the rights of undertrial prisoners in custody who want to participate in the election process. Allowing a person with criminal antecedents of a serious nature would not be in the larger interest of society and would not further the cause of democratic institutions.
The petitioner, a sitting MLA and nominated candidate of a recognised party for the Danapur Assembly seat, sought provisional bail or custody parole for filing nomination and canvassing. He is an accused in multiple criminal cases and was already pursuing regular bail before the trial court and the High Court. He argued that denying him campaign access would make his participation in the democratic process meaningless.
The Counsel for the petitioner argued that the right to seek votes is essential for meaningful electoral participation and that temporary release had been permitted in certain past cases. The counsel invoked Articles 14, 19 and 21, stressing that voters have a right to interact with their candidate.
The State’s counsel opposed the plea, stressing that neither campaigning nor canvassing is a fundamental right. He cited Supreme Court rulings stating that prisoners cannot claim freedom equivalent to free citizens and warned that granting bail for campaigning would open a Pandora’s box.
The Court emphasised that Article 226 jurisdiction cannot substitute the statutory bail mechanism. It relied on various Supreme Court precedents holding that campaigning is not a fundamental, constitutional or human right. The Court also cited observations that many candidates have contested elections from jail and that canvassing can be done through party workers, media and digital platforms.
Accordingly, the petition is dismissed.
