Review: SC Observes That Long-Drawn Live-in Relationships Would Give Rise to Presumption of Valid Consent
In this edition of Court Judgements review, we look at the Supreme Court’s observation that long drawn live-in relationships would give rise to presumption of valid consent, its comments that any attempt to spread communal hatred or indulge in hate speech must be dealt with an iron hand, NCRDC’s decision that multiple compensations for the same cause of action are disallowed, among others.
DCDRC: Imposes penalty on Vistara Airlines for deficiency in service
In the case of Mr. Surendra Singh and Ors vs. Vistara Airlines, the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (DCDRC) in New Delhi found Vistara Airlines guilty of offering deficient services by suddenly cancelling the flight, and ordered payment of compensation to the complainant-passengers.
The facts of the case were that five senior citizens filed a complaint against Vistara Airlines. They had confirmed tickets for a flight from Delhi to Chennai on 16 March 2024. Following this, they arranged a detailed travel itinerary including train and hotel bookings across multiple cities. However, on 12 March 2024, Vistara cancelled their flight without offering any alternate arrangements. This forced the complainants to purchase new tickets from Air India at a higher cost of ₹34,025, incurring an additional ₹2,870. They also faced mental agony and inconvenience due to disrupted travel plans.
The complainants sought compensation totalling ₹5,00,000 for mental trauma, refund of the fare difference, and litigation costs. Despite being served notice, Vistara failed to file a written statement, leading to the case proceeding ex parte. Upon reviewing the evidence, the Commission found Vistara deficient in service. Accordingly, the airline was directed to refund ₹2,870, pay ₹50,000 to each complainant as compensation, and ₹50,000 towards litigation costs, all within four weeks. Failure to comply would result in 9% interest per annum from the date of filing till realisation.
SC: Any attempt to spread communal hatred or indulge in hate speech must be dealt with an iron hand
In Vishal Tiwary (Petitioner) vs. Union of India & Ors (Respondents), the Supreme Court (SC) observed that any attempt to spread communal hatred or indulge in hate speech must be dealt with an iron hand.
The facts of the case were that the petitioner sought suo-motu criminal contempt proceedings against Member of Parliament Nishikant Dubey (respondent No. 4) for making derogatory remarks against the SC and the Chief Justice of India (CJI), allegedly blaming them for inciting civil and religious wars in the country. The petitioner also sought issuance of directions to the Union Ministry of Home Affairs to file an FIR under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, and to issue an advisory to Chief Secretaries to prevent hate speech related to the Waqf (Amendment) Act, 2025.
The Bench, although not inclined to issue notice, chose to dispose of the petition with observations. The court acknowledged that while judicial decisions are open to public criticism under Article 19(1)(a), such freedom does not extend to scandalising the judiciary, which may amount to criminal contempt. Judicial review is essential to democracy and must not be undermined. However, the remarks made by the respondent were deemed highly irresponsible and intended to cast aspersions on the judiciary. Nonetheless, the court emphasised that it does not consider itself so fragile as to be damaged by such statements and chose not to exercise its contempt powers.
Though the petition was dismissed, the court held that hate speech and attempts to create communal disharmony must be dealt with ian ron hand.
SC: The long drawn live-in relationships would give rise to presumption of valid consent
In Ravish Kumar Rana (Appellant) vs. State of Uttarakhand & Anr, the SC observed that long drawn live-in relationships would give rise to a presumption of valid consent.
The facts of the case were that an appellant approached the SC challenging the Uttarakhand High Court’s (HC) refusal to quash the FIR filed against him by Respondent No. 2 (Informant), with whom he was engaged in a live-in relationship. The FIR accused appellant of rape, assault, and criminal intimidation.
The appellant and informant were in a live-in relationship since 2021 and lived together for over two years in a single rented house with mutual consent. The FIR was filed by the informant alleging that she engaged in a physical relationship with the appellant upon a false promise of marriage. However, the promise was broken by the appellant, and on 18 November 2023, the appellant forcibly had intercourse with her.
Refusing these allegations of rape, the appellant cited a settlement agreement dated 19 November 2023—one day after the alleged assault—in which both parties declared mutual love and intent to register their marriage.
The SC held that when two consenting adults live together for an extended period, particularly in a live-in relationship, there arises a presumption of valid and voluntary consent. It noted that the FIR did not allege that sexual relations were exclusively induced by a promise to marry, nor was there any immediate complaint for over two years of cohabitation. Even the allegations of physical abuse were devoid of any material proof. Thus, the court reiterated the settled position that a false promise of marriage amounts to rape only if it can be shown that the promise was deceitful at inception. Mere failure to marry, without evidence of intent to deceive, does not constitute rape.
It further observed that in modern times, financially independent adults often choose live-in relationships, and courts must not adopt a rigid or outdated view. Therefore, it held that the long-term consensual relationship, cohabitation, and the undisputed settlement agreement showed the complaint to be mala fide.
Calling the FIR and proceedings an abuse of the court’s process, the SC quashed the FIR against the appellant and set aside the HC’s order.
NCDRC: Multiple compensations for the same cause of action are disallowed
In Atul Kulshrestha & Anr (Complainants) vs. EMAAR India Limited (Builder and Opposite Party), there was a dispute over compensation for a significant delay in handing over possession of a flat in the Palm Terraces Select project in Gurgaon, Haryana. The complainants had booked the apartment on 14 November 2010, and an Apartment Buyer Agreement (ABA) was signed on 21 December 2010, stipulating delivery within 30 months plus a 3-month grace period from the start of construction. Possession was due by 01 April 2015 but was only offered on 11 March 2019 and handed over on 26 April 2019 — a delay of nearly four years.
The complainants approached the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (SCDRC), Delhi, against the delay. The SCRDC directed the Opposite Party (OP) to pay simple interest at 8% per annum on the deposited amount of ₹1,92,68,146 (after deducting ₹7,81,794 already paid), for the delayed period. Additionally, ₹2,00,000 was awarded for mental agony and ₹50,000 towards legal costs.
Both parties appealed against this order before the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (NDRC). The complainants argued that the compensation was inadequate, citing SC’s precedential orders, which awarded 9% interest in similar cases. They sought enhancement of interest to 9% per annum, ₹10 lakhs for mental agony, and ₹2 lakhs as costs.
The opposite party contended that delays were due to unforeseen and uncontrollable factors. They claimed they had fulfilled obligations as per ABA and argued that awarding 8% interest and ₹2,00,000 for mental agony amounted to double compensation, which is not permissible. They requested a reduction of interest to 6% and cancellation of the mental agony compensation.
The Commission reaffirmed that there was a clear delay in possession. However, awarding additional compensation for mental agony for the same delay is not tenable. Thus, the Commission found 9% interest appropriate, ₹50,000 for legal costs, but struck down the ₹2,00,000 awarded for mental agony. The SCDRC’s order was modified accordingly.
SC: Reasonable Accommodation of PwD and PwBD to equally participate in all spheres of life is not a matter of charity but a fundamental right
In Kabir Paharia (Appellant) vs. National Medical Commission (NMC), the appellant, who is a Scheduled Caste student with benchmark disabilities (PwBD), was denied MBBS admission despite qualifying in NEET UG 2024 with 542 marks and ranking 176 in his SC-PwBD category. Though his physical deformity—absence of multiple fingers in both hands and some toes—was certified as 68% disability, medical boards at both VMMC-Safdarjung and AIIMS, following National Medical Commission (NMC) guidelines, declared him ineligible for pursuing medical courses.
Appellant challenged this before the Delhi HC, which upheld the decision after seeking reassessments. Thus, he approached SC.
The SC held that careful assessment of the medical board’s report dated 24 April 2025 would reveal that the appellant has successfully demonstrated skilled techniques in the simulation laboratory. The medical board further affirmed that the appellant has demonstrated functional adaptation using his existing digits in the tasks assigned during assessment. The minor difficulty the appellant faced was putting on sterilised standard gloves, which was the reason the appellant was denied admission. The SC held that it cannot be a ground for denial of admission, and the denial of admission on the same reason is manifestly illegal, arbitrary and violative of the appellant’s fundamental rights as guaranteed under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. It emphasised that the constitutional promise of equality is not merely formal but substantive, and requires the states to ensure PwD and PwBD candidates are given an opportunity to participate in all spheres of life. Such accommodation is not a matter of charity but a fundamental right flowing from the constitution.
Accordingly, the appeal was allowed, and the direction was issued to grant admission to the appellant.
