In this edition of the Court Judgements review, we look at the Supreme Court’s judgements on mere presence at a crime scene implying guilt; the necessity of preliminary inquiry in corruption cases; and the requirement of physical presence in Domestic Violence Act proceedings, Delhi High Court’s judgement on taking measures for distressed birds in NCT Delhi, and Odisha High Court’s judgement on criminalizing sex under a false promise of marriage.
Supreme Court: Mere presence at the crime scene does not automatically imply guilt
In Vasant @ Girish Akbarasab Sanavale & Anr (Appellants) vs. State of Karnataka (Respondents), the Supreme Court (SC) held that the mere presence of a husband at the crime spot leading to the death of a wife cannot be considered as participating in the crime.
The facts of the case were that Appellant No. 1, Vasant, was married to Geetha for eight years. The couple had three children. The prosecution alleged that after the first year of marriage, Geetha was subjected to constant harassment and cruelty by her husband and mother-in-law (Appellant No.2), primarily over dowry demands and household chores. On 2 January 2013, at around 8:00 PM, while Geetha was at her matrimonial home, her mother-in-law allegedly poured kerosene on her and set her on fire. The neighbours, hearing her cries, rushed to the scene and took her to the hospital. Despite medical treatment, Geetha succumbed to burn injuries a week later.
Geetha’s mother lodged an FIR on 3 January 2013, accusing the husband and mother-in-law of harassment and murder. The FIR stated that the accused had been pressuring Geetha to bring ₹5,000 from her maternal home, and when she refused, they attempted to kill her by burning her. During the investigation, the Tehsildar recorded Geetha’s dying declaration, where she specifically accused her mother-in-law of pouring kerosene and setting her on fire. Medical reports confirmed 90% burns on her body. Police charged the husband and mother-in-law under Sections 498A, 302, and 504 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), and Sections 3 & 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.
The Trial Court acquitted both accused, citing a lack of conclusive evidence. It noted that the dying declaration did not implicate the husband in the actual act of setting Geetha on fire. However, the Karnataka High Court (HC) held that the husband’s presence at the crime scene, his failure to save his wife, and his overall involvement in harassment established his shared intention under Section 34 of IPC. Therefore, it convicted both accused, sentencing them to life imprisonment.
On appeal, the SC upheld the mother-in-law’s conviction based on the dying declaration and medical evidence. However, it acquitted the husband, noting that there is no direct evidence of his active participation in the crime. In fact, the dying declaration mentioned that he tried to douse the flames with water. Accordingly, it held that HC has wrongly inferred common intention under Section 34 of IPC, as mere presence at the crime scene does not automatically imply guilt.
SC: Preliminary enquiry is not always required in corruption cases against government officials, if the available information clearly discloses cognizable offences
In State of Karnataka (Appellant) vs. T. N. Sudhakar Reddy (Respondent), the SC held that the procedural requirement of mandatory preliminary enquiry against public servants is not always required if the available information clearly discloses the cognizable offences.
The facts of the case were that on the direction of the Superintendent of Police (SP), an FIR was lodged by the Karnataka Lokayuktha Police against the Respondent, working as Deputy General Manager (Vigilance) at BESCOM. He was alleged to possess disproportionate assets worth ₹3.81 crores, which were 90% higher than his known income sources. The FIR was based on a source information report from the Karnataka Lokayukta Police, alleging corruption punishable under various sections of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
Respondent challenged the FIR in the Karnataka HC, arguing that no preliminary inquiry was conducted before its registration, violating legal requirements. Agreeing with Respondent, the HC quashed the FIR and held that an independent preliminary inquiry was necessary before proceeding with the case. Appellants challenged the HC verdict in SC.
The SC dealt with two questions: Whether the preliminary inquiry is mandatory under the PC Act, and whether the Superintendent of Police (SP) had the authority to register FIR.
On the preliminary enquiry, the court held that a preliminary inquiry is not always required in corruption cases if the available information clearly discloses a cognizable offence. In the present case, the information disclosed in the source information report was sufficient to register FIR. On SP’s authority, the SC held that the SP does not need a pre-registered FIR to issue such an order. A detailed source information report can serve as the basis for both FIR registration and investigation.
Accordingly, the SC quashed the judgment of the HC and reinstated the FIR, allowing the case to proceed.
Supreme Court: There is no requirement for the personal presence of any party in the proceedings under the Domestic Violence Act
In Vishal Shah vs. Monalisha Gupta & Ors., the Supreme Court held that proceedings under the Domestic Violence (DV) Act are quasi-criminal in nature, thus, there cannot be any justification to require the personal presence of the appellant in these proceedings.
The Apex Court was hearing an appeal against the order of the Calcutta High Court which dismissed the petition filed by the appellant against the judgement of Judicial Magistrate, Howrah that directed the competent authorities to start the extradition process against the appellant. The brief facts of the case are as follows. The appellant and respondent were married on 19 February 2018 as per Hindu rites. In March 2018, they moved to the USA, where the appellant, a Software Engineer since 2014, alleges he faced domestic abuse. On 23 March 2018, he reported an incident to the police, showing visible injuries, but declined to press charges. Despite a warning, the abuse continued, leading to a second-degree assault charge against the respondent on 2 April 2018.
Due to irreconcilable differences, the couple separated after 80 days of marriage and returned to India. The respondent refused to return to the USA, and the appellant left alone on 19 May 2018. Following this, the respondent initiated multiple legal proceedings against the appellant and his family, leading to the impoundment of his passport on 3 October 2018. Between 2018 and 2020, the respondent allegedly harassed the appellant’s mother, forcing her to leave the house and file Complaint Case No. 446C of 2020. In response, the respondent filed an application under Section 26 of the Domestic Violence Act, resulting in Miscellaneous Case No. 440 of 2022.
On 11 August 2022, the court ordered the appellant’s personal appearance. When he failed to appear, extradition proceedings were initiated. Aggrieved, the appellant filed CRR No. 135 of 2023 before the Calcutta High Court, which was dismissed on 25 January 2023. In this appeal, the appellant seeks dissolution of marriage under Article 142 of the Constitution, citing irretrievable breakdown.
After careful consideration of the arguments and pleadings, the first issue for determination is the legality of the extradition process initiated against the appellant. It is undisputed that the appellant’s passport was impounded on 3 October 2018 due to various matrimonial and legal cases filed against him by the respondent. The Judicial Magistrate, First Class (JMFC), while passing the order dated 15 September 2022, was aware of the passport’s impoundment. However, as proceedings under the DV Act are quasi-criminal in nature and do not mandate personal presence except in cases involving a breach of a protection order under Section 31, the Magistrate erred in requiring the appellant’s personal appearance. Since the appellant’s non-appearance was due to circumstances beyond his control, the order directing extradition is legally unsustainable.
The next issue for consideration is whether the marriage has irretrievably broken down, justifying the exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court, in precedents such as Shilpa Sailesh vs. Varun Sreenivasan and Kiran Jyot Maini vs. Anish Pramod Patel, has held that factors such as the duration of cohabitation, nature of disputes, and multiple litigations must be considered when determining whether a marriage has completely failed.
The extensive litigation initiated by the respondent, the prolonged separation, and the evident bitterness in the relationship indicate an irretrievable breakdown. Additionally, the absence of children from the marriage supports the exercise of discretion under Article 142, as no third-party interests are affected by dissolution. The Court finds this an appropriate case to grant divorce on the grounds of irretrievable breakdown of marriage. Regarding alimony, based on the standard of living during marriage, duration of separation, and financial circumstances, a one-time settlement of Rs. 25 lakhs is deemed fair and reasonable.
Before concluding, the Court addressed the illegality of the appellant’s passport impoundment. In Maneka Gandhi vs. Union of India, the Supreme Court emphasized that natural justice must be upheld before impounding a passport. The impoundment in this case was executed without granting the appellant a hearing, rendering it legally unsound. Further, in Rajesh Sharma vs. State of U.P, it was held that. in respect of persons ordinarily residing out of India impounding of passports or issuance of ‘Red Corner Notice’ should not be a routine. Therefore, the concerned authorities are directed to release the appellant’s passport within one week.
In light of the above, the orders by the JMFC, Howrah, and the High Court are quashed. The marriage between the appellant and the respondent is dissolved on the grounds of irretrievable breakdown. Consequently, the appeal is disposed of accordingly.
Delhi HC: Department of Forests and Wildlife, GNCTD and Delhi Police shall evolve an appropriate mechanism for taking requisite measures for rescuing the distressed birds in NCT of Delhi
In Save India Foundation vs. Department of Forest and Wildlife & Ors., the Delhi High Court remarked that the authorities shall develop an appropriate mechanism for rescuing distressed birds in NCTD, taking into account the petitioner’s recommendations.
The petitioner, Save Indian Foundation, has initiated the Public Interest Litigation (PIL) to address concerns regarding distressed birds in the National Capital Territory of Delhi (NCTD). The petition seeks directions for immediate action by the relevant authorities to rescue such birds. The petitioner contends that despite several reports of birds in distress being brought to the attention of the authorities, both respondent No. 1—Department of Forests and Wildlife, GNCTD—and respondent No. 3—Delhi Police—have cited a lack of infrastructure and resources as reasons for their inaction. The responsibility for rescuing distressed birds in NCTD primarily lies with respondent No. 1 (Department of Forests and Wildlife, GNCTD) and respondent No. 3 (Delhi Police). Therefore, the court disposes of the petition with the following directions:
- The petitioner, Save Indian Foundation, shall submit a comprehensive representation to Respondent No. 1 and Respondent No. 3, highlighting instances of birds in distress and providing suggestions for establishing an appropriate rescue mechanism.
- Upon receipt of such representation, the officials of respondent No. 1 and respondent No. 3 shall jointly examine and consider the issues raised and the proposed measures.
- The authorities shall develop an appropriate mechanism for rescuing distressed birds in NCTD, taking into account the petitioner’s recommendations.
- This mechanism shall be formulated expeditiously, preferably within three months.
- While making a decision under this order, the officials of respondent No. 1 and respondent No. 3 shall also seek input and cooperation from relevant expert bodies, such as the Animal Welfare Board of the Government of Delhi.
Accordingly, the petition is disposed of.
Odisha High Court: In the jurisprudence of sexual offences, the absence or presence of consent is not merely a factual consideration but the very essence of criminal culpability.
In Manoj Kumar Munda vs. State of Odisha & Anr., the Odisha High Court ruled that not every unfulfilled promise amounts to a legal violation, nor does the law criminalize all failed relationships. The court emphasized that in cases of sexual offences, consent is a crucial determinant of criminal liability. The prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that consent was absent or obtained through coercion, deception, or incapacity.
The single-judge bench of Justice S.K. Panigrahi was hearing a petition challenging the initiation of criminal proceedings in Bolangir Town PS Case No. 191 of 2021. The charges include offences under Sections 376(2)(a), 376(2)(i), 376(2)(n), 294, 506, and 34 of the IPC. The complainant alleged that the petitioner engaged in a long-term relationship with her under the false promise of marriage, which later led to alleged sexual exploitation and mental harassment. Interestingly, in 2023, the prosecutrix filed a Civil Proceeding (CP No. 169 of 2023) in the Family Court, Sambalpur, seeking a declaration that she is the legally married wife of the Petitioner and also an injunction to prevent him from marrying anyone else. In the civil suit, she claimed that, on 03 February 2021, she and the Petitioner had solemnized their marriage at Samaleswari Temple, Sambalpur, and exchanged garlands, vermilion, and mangalsutra. She also alleged that they applied for marriage registration under the Special Marriage Act, but the Petitioner failed to appear for the registration on 18 March 2021.
The Counsel for the Petitioner argued that the relationship was consensual and lasted nearly nine years, with both parties voluntarily engaging in physical intimacy. The complainant’s statements were inconsistent—while the FIR alleged a false promise of marriage, she separately filed a civil suit (CP No. 169 of 2023) claiming they were already married under Hindu customs. There was no medical or documentary evidence supporting her claims of forced administration of contraceptive pills or a suicide attempt. The allegations were fabricated to harass the petitioner after their relationship ended.
The Counsel for the complainant argued that she was sexually exploited under false assurances of marriage, constituting rape under Section 376 IPC, and the matter warranted a full trial, and quashing the FIR would prevent the prosecution from presenting evidence.
The Court noted that the core legal issue was whether the petitioner’s failure to marry the complainant vitiated her consent under Section 375 IPC. Citing Pramod Suryabhan Pawar vs. State of Maharashtra (2019) and Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar vs. State of Maharashtra (2019), the court reiterated that a false promise of marriage constitutes rape only if the promise was made in bad faith, with no intention of fulfilment at the outset. The complainant’s contradictory claims—alleging rape on one hand while asserting a valid marriage in a civil suit—cast doubt on the veracity of her allegations. A long-term consensual relationship that ended in non-marriage does not automatically amount to rape.
The Court observed that the assumption that a woman consents to intimacy solely as a step toward marriage, or that her agreement to one act implies commitment to another, stems from outdated patriarchal notions rather than principles of justice. The law must not support such a distortion of choice, where personal disappointments are framed as legal grievances, and failed relationships are misrepresented as acts of deception.
Furthermore, the Court emphasized that justice must not be reduced to moral policing. Sexual agency is not a binding contract with a predetermined outcome, nor should it be interpreted as an implicit obligation to marry. To assume otherwise would be to deny women their autonomy, desire, and choice, reducing them to mere bearers of honour rather than individuals with an intrinsic right to self-determination over their own bodies and decisions. The ability of a woman to engage in intimacy on her own terms—free from coercion, expectation, and archaic social contracts—must be protected, not punished.
Applying the principles laid down in State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal (1992), the court held that the FIR was an abuse of legal process and quashed the proceedings.
