Review: Madras HC Rules that Juvenile Justice Act prevails over Muslim Personal Law, adopted child will have same status as biological child.
In this edition of the court judgments review, we examine the Supreme Court’s ruling on age bar in surrogacy act, Madras High Court’s judgement on cultural status to cock fights and also the prevalence of Juvenile Justice Act over Muslim Personal Law, Himachal Pradesh High Court’s order on Right to Temple Worship, and Bombay High Court’s judgement on extension of judicial remand.
Supreme Court: Age restriction under the Surrogacy Act cannot be permitted to operate retrospectively to deny the right to have a surrogate child or become parents.
In Arun Muthuvel vs. Union of India and connected cases, the Supreme Court held that when there was no age restriction at the stage of creation of embryos and freezing them i.e., prior to the enforcement of the Surrogacy (Regulation) Act,2021, the age restriction under the act cannot be permitted to operate retrospectively to frustrate their right to become parents, which is a Constitutional Right under Article 21 of the Constitution.
The case involved three couples who had created and frozen embryos prior to 25 January 2022, the date the Act took effect. However, by the time they sought official certification, the female and male partners had crossed the upper age limits of 50 and 55 years prescribed under Section 4(iii)(c)(I) of the Act. Their surrogacy plans, delayed largely by the COVID-19 pandemic, came to a standstill.
The petitioners argued that the new law could not nullify procedures initiated under the earlier, unregulated regime. They claimed that reproductive choice and the right to become parents were integral to the right to personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution. They argued that imposing an arbitrary age cap violated this right and had no rational connection with the Act’s purpose of preventing exploitation of surrogate mothers. They also cited precedents establishing that statutes affecting vested rights cannot be retrospectively applied unless expressly stated.
The Union of India defended the age limits as a matter of legislative policy, citing medical evidence that fertility and gamete quality decline with age and that children deserve parents of a reasonable age. It argued that surrogacy is a statutory privilege, not a fundamental right, and that the law aimed to protect surrogate mothers and children.
Hearing both sides, the Court held that couples who had already completed fertilisation and frozen embryos for implantation had commenced the surrogacy process before the Act’s enforcement. Their right to proceed, having vested under the earlier legal framework, could not be taken away retrospectively. Such retrospective application denies them the right to have a surrogate child or to become parents, the latter being recognised as the fundamental right under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution. The court also held that the state’s job is not to decide the suitability of the parents.
The Court further clarified that this relief was limited only to those who had begun the process before January 2022 and did not strike down the age limits for future cases. Emphasising that reproductive autonomy is part of the constitutional right to life and dignity, the Court allowed all three couples to proceed with surrogacy using embryos created before the Act’s enforcement.
Madras HC: Cultural status cannot be conferred on cock fight in the State of Tamil Nadu, even though they are prevalent.
The Madurai Bench of the Madras High Court, in M Muventhan vs. The District Collector, dismissed a writ petition seeking permission to conduct a cockfight event in Kaaraikeni, Madurai District, observing that such events are expressly prohibited under the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960.
The petitioner had sought a Writ of Certiorarified Mandamus to quash the District Collector’s order dated 19 September 2025, which denied permission for a cockfight scheduled on 26 October 2025. The petitioner argued that the event would be conducted without knives and referred to previous High Court orders that had permitted similar events under certain conditions.
Justice G.R. Swaminathan, however, refused to follow those single-judge rulings, holding that they ran contrary to the binding Division Bench decision in S. Kannan vs. Commissioner of Police, Madurai City. The Bench had interpreted Sections 11(1)(m)(ii) and (n) of the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act to prohibit all animal fights conducted for entertainment, giving the term animal a broad meaning that includes birds. The judge noted that when conflicting decisions exist, courts must follow the one supported by principle and statutory reasoning; in this case, Kannan.
The Court also referred to the Director General of Police’s circular dated 28 August 2025, which reiterated that cockfights should not be permitted, echoing earlier High Court directions. Citing a 2018 Deccan Herald report on a Supreme Court order allowing traditional cockfights in Telangana (without knives), the judge clarified that such exceptional directions were issued under Article 142, a power not available to High Courts. The Court further observed that while events like Jallikattu have cultural protection through specific legislation and Article 29 of the Constitution, no such statutory backing exists for cockfighting in Tamil Nadu. It remarked that cultural familiarity or cinematic portrayal cannot legitimise an act that the statute clearly prohibits.
The Court held that cockfighting, even without knives, violates Sections 11(1)(m) and (n) of the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act. The petition was accordingly dismissed.
Himachal Pradesh HC: State must balance faith and public order, cannot pass blanket orders curtailing the right to practise faith.
The Himachal Pradesh High Court, in Padam Sharma & Ors. vs. State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors, settled a long-standing dispute over Diwali celebrations at the Mahasu Devta temple in Village Gaunkhar, Chopal, by permitting the event under strict regulation instead of imposing a complete ban.
Residents of Gaunkhar sought enforcement of a 2020 order by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate (SDM) that restrained people from neighbouring villages of Dhar Chandna and Bawat from entering Gaunkhar during Diwali. The petitioners cited earlier incidents of violence, intoxication, and clashes during celebrations, claiming that the presence of outsiders disrupted peace and violated a written compromise signed in November 2020.
The respondents argued that celebrating Diwali at the Mahasu Devta temple is a centuries-old religious tradition shared among the neighbouring villages, protected under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution. They contended that a few isolated incidents could not justify depriving the entire community of its religious rights.
The Court agreed that while public order and safety are legitimate concerns for imposing restrictions, an absolute ban would be disproportionate and infringe upon the fundamental right to practice religion under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution. The Court held that administrative oversight and police deployment, rather than exclusion, were the appropriate way to maintain peace.
Accordingly, the Court allowed residents of Dhar Chandna and Bawat to participate in Diwali celebrations scheduled from 20 October 2025, but imposed stringent conditions, including no weapons, no intoxication, no processions, and limited use of torches. The Deputy Commissioner and Superintendent of Police were directed to ensure adequate security, and local panchayats were made responsible for compliance.
Disposing of the petition, the Court urged all parties to engage in dialogue to find a permanent, peaceful solution for future festivities.
Madras HC: Juvenile Justice Act prevails over Muslim Personal Law, adopted child will have same status as biological child.
The Madras High Court, in K. Heerajohn vs. The District Registrar and Another held that Muslims seeking to adopt a child must follow the procedure prescribed under the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015, and the Adoption Regulations, 2022, rather than simply executing and registering an adoption deed.
The petitioner, a Muslim man married to Kadhan Beevi, had no children. His widowed sister-in-law offered to give her eight-year-old son up for adoption. An adoption deed dated 13 September 2025 was executed and presented for registration, but the Sub-Registrar refused to register it, prompting the writ petition.
The Court observed that while Islam does not recognise adoption, the JJ Act provides a secular, statutory mechanism enabling adoption across religions. Relying on the Supreme Court’s ruling in Shabnam Hashmi vs. Union of India (2014), the Court held that the Act allows any person, irrespective of religion, to adopt a child following the statutory procedure. However, the petitioner could not bypass the procedure by merely registering a deed.
The Court emphasised that under Sections 56–63 of the JJ Act and Regulation 54 of the 2022 Adoption Regulations, adoption must be processed through the District Child Protection Unit and finalised by the District Magistrate. Once the Magistrate issues the adoption order, registration of the deed becomes unnecessary.
While declining to issue a mandamus to compel registration, the Court directed authorities to facilitate the online application process and ensure verification within three weeks, followed by a prompt decision by the District Magistrate. Justice Swaminathan also urged authorities to minimise procedural delays, noting that prolonged adoption timelines deprive children of the nurturing environment they deserve.
The writ petition was disposed of with directions, reaffirming that adoption, though not a fundamental right, is a recognised human right within India’s statutory framework.
Bombay HC: Detention beyond the period of 60 days is violative of Section 187(3) of the BNSS, and also Article 21 of the Constitution.
The Bombay High Court, in Ranganth Tulshiram Galande & Anr. vs. State of Maharashtra, granted default bail to the petitioners in a case arising from a crime registered at Shrigonda Police Station, holding that their continued custody violated the mandatory provisions of Section 187(3) of the Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) and the fundamental right to liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution.
The petitioners had been arrested on 7 July 2025 for offences under Sections 316(2), 318(2), 318(4) read with 3(5) of the Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS) and Section 3 of the Maharashtra Protection of Interest of Depositors (MPID) Act, 1999. Under Section 187(3) of BNSS, the investigation was required to be completed and a charge sheet filed within 60 days. However, no charge sheet was filed by 5 September 2025, entitling the accused to default bail.
The prosecution claimed that invoking Section 316(5) of the BNS, which carries punishment of life imprisonment, automatically extended the investigation period to 90 days. The Sessions Court accepted that view and denied bail.
The HC Court disagreed, holding that mere invocation of an additional section does not automatically extend the remand period unless the Magistrate passes a reasoned and speaking order under Section 187(3) of BNSS, after hearing the accused. In this case, the Magistrate had merely marked seen on the investigating officer’s application, which is insufficient to satisfy the statutory mandate.
The Court emphasised that the right to default bail is an indefeasible and constitutional right, intrinsically linked to personal liberty. Any deviation from statutory procedure, such as extending custody without judicial satisfaction, renders further detention illegal. Citing precedents like Pankaj Yadav vs. State of Maharashtra and Rajkumar Bhagchand Jain vs. Union of India, the Court reiterated that procedural safeguards cannot be diluted.
Accordingly, the High Court set aside the Sessions Court’s order and directed that the petitioners be released on default bail.