Review: Karnataka HC Rules That Medical Reimbursement Cannot be Denied Solely Due to a Change in Name of the Hospital.

Court Judgements_ Image

In this edition of court judgements, we shall look into Supreme Court’s judgement finalizing the draft of the Constitution of the All India Football Federation (AIFF), Right to Housing as a Fundamental Right under Article 21, and dismissing plea against Karnataka Govt’s Invite To Booker Prize Winner Banu Mushtaq For Dasara Festival, Delhi High Court’s judgement on damages for interfering with marriage, and Karnataka High Court on medical reimbursement in cases of name changes of hospitals.

Supreme Court: Sports should not become a privilege of the few but a medium through which fraternity is strengthened across society.

The Supreme Court, in All India Football Federation vs. Rahul Mehra and Ors., held that it is necessary to ensure that sporting facilities and opportunities are not concentrated in the hands of the urban economic elite, while finalising the draft constitution for All India Football Federation (AIFF).

The Apex Court was hearing a challenge against the Delhi High Court order that stayed the AIFF elections, and subsequently set aside the 2016 election results. The Supreme Court stayed that order, appointed a Committee of Administrators (CoA) to draft a new Constitution for the AIFF aligned with the National Sports Development Code, 2011 (NSC 2011) and Model Guidelines.

Some of the major issues identified by the Apex court are:

On the question of including Eminent Players, the Apex Court held that while it is correct that clauses 3.9 or 3.10 of the NSC 2011 do not confer voting rights on individual members of an association, it is equally true that clause 3.20 explicitly grants voting rights to a specific sub-category of individual members, i.e., “prominent sportspersons of outstanding merit”. It also held that freedom of choice to form an association is not in any way compromised by the requirement to incorporate 15 eminent players.

On whether there is a need for retaining control over AIFF, the apex court held that it is not appropriate to have continuous monitoring of a sports federation by any forum, including the Supreme Court. On the permanency of the AIFF administration, the Court held that the current executive committee can be treated as a permanent body which shall discharge its function in accordance with the relevant laws as well as the AIFF Constitution.

Going further, the apex court held that Accessibility in sports is vital, as equal opportunities regardless of race, caste, religion, sex, or economic status, enhance its unifying power. Sports must not remain a privilege of the few but a means to foster fraternity and common purpose. To achieve this, facilities and opportunities cannot be confined to the urban elite, and revenues from events, intellectual property, and media rights must be distributed to promote affordable and inclusive sport across the country.

Accordingly, the court directed the AIFF administration to call for a special general body meeting and adopt the draft Constitution with the modifications in this judgment within 4 weeks.

Supreme Court: Right to housing is a fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution

The Supreme Court, in Mansi Brar Fernades vs. Shubha Sharma and Anr, held that the right to secure, peaceful, and timely possession of one’s home is a facet of the fundamental right to shelter enshrined under Article 21, and the State carries a constitutional obligation to create and strictly enforce a framework wherein no developer is permitted to defraud or exploit homebuyers.

The brief facts of the case are as follows. Mansi Brar Fernandes entered into a 2016 MoU with Gayatri Infra Planner Pvt. Ltd. for four flats under a buy-back arrangement, paying ₹35 lakhs. The developer failed to deliver possession or honour post-dated cheques worth ₹1 crore. She initiated proceedings under Section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC), 2016, which the NCLT admitted. On appeal, however, the NCLAT (2020) branded her a “speculative investor” and reversed admission. A similar petition by Sunita Agarwal (Antriksh Infratech project) was also rejected by NCLAT in 2021. Cross-appeals by directors challenged the applicability of the IBC (Amendment) Ordinance, 2019, which required 10% or 100 homebuyers to jointly file Section 7 petitions.

The major issues involved are whether the appellants were “speculative investors”, disentitling them from invoking Section 7 IBC and whether the ordinance introducing threshold requirements applied to pending cases.

The Appellants argued they were genuine homebuyers under Section 5(8)(f) IBC, relying on Pioneer Urban Land & Infrastructure Ltd vs. Union of India (2019), which recognised allottees as financial creditors. Respondents contended that buy-back clauses, post-dated cheques, and high assured returns showed speculative intent. They also cited Binani Industries vs. Bank of Baroda (2018) and Manish Kumar vs. Union of India (2021) to argue that compliance with statutory thresholds was mandatory.

The Court reiterated that the IBC is not a recovery tool but a resolution framework. Distinguishing genuine buyers from speculative investors is essential (Pioneer Urban, Swiss Ribbons vs. Union of India (2019)). Indicators of speculation include buy-back clauses, unrealistic assured returns, and the absence of intent to take possession. The Court upheld NCLAT’s finding that Fernandes and Agarwal were speculative investors, affirming dismissal of their Section 7 applications. However, it clarified that they may pursue claims before RERA, consumer forums, or civil courts.

The Court further held that it would be thoroughly erroneous to treat home-buying as a mere commercial transaction, or worse, to reduce housing to the status of speculative instruments, as the right to secure, peaceful, and timely possession of one’s home is a facet of the fundamental right to shelter enshrined under Article 21.

Supreme Court: Plea against Banu Mushtaq’s Dasara Invite dismissed

The Supreme Court, in H.S. Gaurav vs. State of Karnataka, dismissed a challenge against the Karnataka High Court decision, which upheld the decision of the State Government to invite Booker Prize winner Banu Mushtaq as the Chief Guest for the Dasara festival celebration inauguration at Chamundi temple, Mysuru.

The brief facts of the case are as follows. The petitioners challenged the Government of Karnataka’s decision to invite Banu Mushtaq, a Booker Prize-winning author, to inaugurate the Dasara festivities at Chamundeshwari Hills on 22 September 2025. The petitioners contended that the inaugural ceremony involves performing Hindu religious rituals, such as lighting the sacred lamp (Deepa Prajwalam), offering flowers and fruits, and participating in Vedic prayers, and that a non-Hindu should not perform these rituals. They claimed the invitation violated Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution of India and cited previous speeches of Banu Mushtaq as anti-Hindu and anti-Kannada.

The questions for consideration are whether inviting Banu Mushtaq infringed the petitioners’ rights under Articles 25 (freedom of religion) and 26 (rights of religious denominations) of the Constitution and whether religious rituals integral to Dasara could be performed only by a Hindu.

The petitioners relied on Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras vs. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt, Adi Saiva Sivachariyargal Nala Sangam vs. Government of Tamil Nadu (2016), D. Senthilkumar vs. Government of Tamil Nadu (2023), and Sri Venkataramana Devaru vs. State of Mysore to assert protection of agamic traditions. The State argued the Dasara festivities are State-sponsored, not temple-specific, and invitations cannot discriminate based on religion or caste, citing prior instances of non-Hindus being invited.

The High Court held that the petitioners do not represent any religious denomination or section whose rights under Article 26 are curtailed. Participation of a person of another faith in State-sponsored festivities does not violate Articles 25 or 26. The cited precedents were distinguished, as they involved management of religious institutions or appointment in temples, not State-organised celebrations. The State may invite accomplished individuals irrespective of their religion to inaugurate State-sponsored functions.

When challenged before the apex court, the plea was dismissed, and the Apex Court chose not to interfere with the order of the Karnataka High Court.

Delhi High Court: Spouse can seek compensation from those alleged to have contributed to the breach of that sanctified bond.

The Delhi High Court, in Shelly Mahajan vs. Bhanushree Bahl, held that when one spouse claims to have suffered legal injury on account of the disruption of the marital relationship, the law, under tort, recognises that compensation may be sought from those alleged to have contributed to the breach of that sanctified bond.

The brief facts of the case are as follows. Shelly Mahajan married defendant no. 2 in 2012, had twin children in 2018. In 2021, defendant no. 1 (Bhanushree Bahl) joined defendant no. 2’s business venture as an Analyst. It is alleged that defendant no. 1 developed an intimate relationship with her husband, causing withdrawal of affection and companionship. In March 2023, the plaintiff discovered letters confirming an extramarital relationship. Defendant no. 2 filed for divorce in April 2025. Shelly Mahajan sued for damages, claiming tort of Alienation of Affection (AoA).

One of the major issues for consideration is whether the tort of Alienation of Affection (AoA) is maintainable under Indian law; whether the Civil Court has jurisdiction or the Family Court has exclusive jurisdiction under Section 7 Family Courts Act, 1984 and whether summons should be issued against defendants for damages claiming tortious interference with marital relationship.

While the defendants argued that the suit was not maintainable, claiming that the family court has exclusive jurisdiction as there are divorce proceedings pending. Counsel for Shelly Mahajan argued that a prima facie case was established for the tort of AoA; entitled to damages for withdrawal of affection and companionship due to defendant no. 1’s overt acts; civil tort action maintainable.

The High Court referenced Pinakin Mahipatray Rawal vs. State of Gujarat (2013) and Indra Sarma vs. V.K.V. Sarma (2013), recognising AoA as an intentional tort in principle. It further distinguished a tortious interference claim independent of a marital relationship, not arising from the matrimonial bond itself, by applying the cause of action test as held in Geeta Anand vs. Tanya Arjun. The Court further held that AoA derives from Anglo-American “heart-balm” torts but remains nascent in India. Under Hohfeldian framework, a spouse possesses a protectable interest in the marital consortium, creating a correlative duty on third parties not to intentionally interfere.

The Court allowed issuance of summons, holding AoA maintainable as a civil tort action distinct from matrimonial proceedings. It held that the Civil Court retains jurisdiction as a cause of action based on independent tortious conduct, not intrinsically linked to the marital relationship.

Karnataka High Court: Medical reimbursement cannot be denied solely due to a change in the name of the hospital.

The Karnataka High Court, in Dr. Shivanandappa Doddagoudar vs. State of Karnataka, held that medical reimbursement cannot be denied solely due to a change in the name of the hospital when it remains the same entity that was previously recognised.

The brief facts of the case are as follows. Petitioner’s medical reimbursement claim was rejected because the hospital, ‘Kasturba Hospital, Manipal’, was not found in the Government-recognised list of private hospitals eligible for medical reimbursement as per Annexure-A1. The hospital was originally named ‘Kasturba Medical College Hospital, Manipal’ and was present in the approved list. On 23 March 2021, the hospital formally requested a name change to ‘Kasturba Hospital, Manipal’ in conformity with the registration certificate issued by the Karnataka Private Medical Establishment Authority, Udupi. Despite the hospital’s communication regarding name change, the Government failed to update the approved list, resulting in the rejection of the reimbursement claim.

The Petitioner argued that the hospital was originally approved and remains the same legal entity; name change was duly communicated and recorded under the Karnataka Private Medical Establishment Act; denial based solely on non-updated nomenclature is arbitrary.

The Government contended that only names appearing exactly as listed in the approved list can be considered; deviations, including name changes, cannot be accepted.

Considering the submissions, the Court noted the purpose of maintaining a recognised list under Clause (ff) of Rule 3 of Karnataka Government Servants (Medical Attendance) Rules, 1963 is to ensure services from vetted and approved institutions. The hospital remains the same legal entity with a duly recorded name change. Authorities failed to verify the request and update the recognised list despite a formal application. Denial of reimbursement merely on account of non-updated nomenclature when the entity remains the same is arbitrary and legally unsustainable.

Accordingly, the court directed the respondent to reconsider the petitioner’s application for medical reimbursement.